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Simplejustice requires thatpublicfunds, to which all taxpayers
ofall races contribute, not be spent in anyfashion which encour-
ages, entrenches, subsidizes or results in racial discrimination.
- President John F. Kennedy'
L Introduction
Tai Kwan Cureton planned to go to college on an athletic scholarship.2
He had the grades He had the athletic prowess What he did not have,
however, was a high enough standardized test score.' According to rules
1. See 133 CONG. REc. S2353 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1987) (statement of Sen. Kerry)
(quoting President Johm F. Kennedy's appeal to Congress on June 19, 1963, upon submission
of Civil Rights Act of 1964). Senator Kerry quoted President Kennedy during his opening
statement in support of the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987. Id. For a more detailed
discussion of the Civil Rights Restoration Act, see infia Part lLB2.
2. See Cureton v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 198 F3d 107, 109 (3d Cir. 1999)
[hereinafter Cureton Ill (detailing steps Plaintiff took towards pursuing opportunity to compete
as freshman in varsity intercollegiate athletics), rev'g 37 F. Supp. 2d 687 (ED. Pa. 1999)
[hereinafter Cureton I]. For clarity purposes, this Note will refer to the Cureton district court
opinion, Cureton v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 37 F. Supp. 2d 687 (ED. Pa. 1999), as
Cureton L This Note will refer to the Third Circuit opinion, Cureton v. National Collegiate
AthleticAss'n, 198 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 1999) as Cureton.U. Cureton Hreversed Cureton I, but
the district court's fact finding and analysis remain crucial. See infra notes 18 and 26 for a
more complete discussion of Cureton /I and its grounds for reversal.
3. See Cureton I, 198 F.3d at 109 (noting that Plaintiff Tai Kwan Cureton ranked
twenty-seventh out of class of 305 students at Simon Gratz High School in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania). Plaintiff Leatrice Shaw ranked fifth in the same class and also was selected for
membership in National Honor Society. Id. at 109-10.
4. See id. at 109 (acknowledging that plaintiff Tai Kwan Cureton earned athletic honors
as member of his high school track team and was recruited by several Division I schools). The
National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) separates its member institutions - a majority
of which are public and private four-year colleges - into three Divisions for competition and
organizational purposes. See Cureton I, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 690 (describing structural details of
voluntary athletic association). Plaintiff Cureton eventually enrolled in a Division III school.
Cureton Hf, 198 F.3d at 109.
5. See Cureton 1, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 689 (noting that all four named plaintiffs failed to
meet minimum standardized test cutoff score).
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promulgated by the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), Cure-
ton failed to achieve the combination score necessary to participate in inter-
collegiate athletics and to receive athletically related financial aid during his
freshman year.6 Simply put - no score, no scholarship.
Cureton and other similarly situated plaintiffs sued the NCAA under
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VI).7 In Cureton v. National
Collegiate AthleticAssociation,8 plaintiffs claimed thatthe NCAA's minimum
test score requirement had an unjustified "disparate impact" 9 upon African-
American student-athletes, and the district court agreed.'0 Although the dis-
6. See id. at 690-91 (interpreting academic standards required by NCAA Bylaw 14.3,
also known as "Proposition 16"). The eligibility rules implemented in the 1996-97 academic
year require high school graduates to earn a 2.000 grade point average (GPA) in thirteen
academic core courses in tandem with a composite standardized test score determined by a
"sliding scale." Id. at 690. For example, a student with a 2.000 GPA could establish eligibility
if he or she also scores either a 1010 on the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) or an 86 on the
American College Test (ACT). Id. at 690-91. However, a student with a OPA of 2.500 or
higher need only score a minimum of 820 on the SAT or a 68 on the ACT. Id. at 691. The
NCAA has promulgated minimum academic standards like Proposition 16 since 1965. See
Kenneth L. Shropshire, Colorblind Propositions: Race, the SAT, & the NCAA, 8 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REV. 141,143 (1997) ("The 1965 rule required students to have a high school record and
standardized test scores sufficient to 'predict' a college grade point average of 1.6 ..... (citing
PAUL C. WEMER& GARYR. ROBERTS, SPORTS AND THELAW 532 (1993))). Howeverthe initial
standards were insufficient because "[d]uring the early 1980s ... evidence existed that student-
athletes were being exploited for their athletic talents and were exhausting their athletic eligibil-
ity without any realistic hope of obtaining an undergraduate degree." See id. Stories of star
college athletes such as Chris Washburn and John "Hot Rod" Williams also motivated the
NCAA to adopt a rule utilizing more than a subjective GPA standard. Id. Washburn and
Williams scored a combined 470 on the SAT, yet both were still eligible under the old rules.
Id. In fact, both athletes were recruited by over 100 schools despite the gross disparity between
their scores and the scores of the average student Id. For example, Washburn initialy enrolled
at North Carolina State University, where the average SAT score was 1020. Id. Williams
enrolled at Tulane University, where the average score was 1120. Id. (citing MURRAY SPERBER,
COILEGE SPORTS INc.: THE AT ncDEPARTMENT VERsus Tm UNIVERSITY218-19 (1990)).
7. Cureton , 37 F. Supp. 2d 687, 687 (E.D. Pa. 1999); see 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1998)
("No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.").
8. 37 F. Supp. 2d 687 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
9. See Cureton I% 198 F.3d 107, 112 n.4 (3d Cir. 1999) (explaining that "[a] disparate
impact case is based upon the idea that 'some... practices, adopted without a deliberately
discriminatory motive, may in operation be functionally equivalent to intentional discnmina-
tion'" (citing Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987 (1988))). Many cases
have applied this theory to educational institutions and practices. See New York Urban League,
Inc. v. New York, 71 F.3d 1031,1036 (2d Cir. 1995) (collecting cases).
10. See Cureton , 37 F. Supp. 2d 687, 689 (ED. Pa. 1999) (holding that NCAA's initial
eligibility rule had unjustified disparate impact upon African-Americans). In Cureton , the
district court considered whether the NCAA was subject to suit under Title V, and if so,
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parate impact analysis is indeed interesting, one preliminary holding emerges
as even more striking." Before addressing the constitutionality of the score
minimums, the court first had to rule that Title VI's standards applied to the
NCAA.12 Title VI's nondiscrimination requirements only apply to entities that
receive federal financial assistance.'3 Therefore, Cureton's discrimination
claim could succeed onlyifthe court first ruled that the NCAA was a statutory
recipient of federal financial assistance.14
The Cureton court rested its ruling that the NCAA had to comply with
Title V's standards on two theories that the plaintiffs proposed.15 First, the
court found that Title VI's standards bound the NCAA because it was an
"indirect recipient" of federal financial assistance.' 6 The court ruled that the
NCAA was an indirect recipient because the organization exercised complete
control over a federal grant to its National Youth Sports Program Fund."
whether the organization's minimum standardized test score requirement had an unjustified
disparate impact against Afican-Americans. Id. Plaintiffs alleged that the NCAA's initial
eligibility rules governing how one qualifies to participate in collegiate athletics violated their
Title VI rights. Id However, before it could consider granting Plaintiffs' requested relief, the
court first had to hold the NCAA subject to Title VI MaL at 692. After proffering two possible
grounds for subjecting the NCAA to a Title VI suit, the court next considered whether the
organization's rules had an unjustified disparate impact Id. at 696-712. The court ultimately
declared the score minimums illegal under Title VI and permanently enjoined the NCAA from
using them. Id. at 715.
11. See id. at 696-714 (discussing whether Proposition 16 causes racially disproportionate
effect and whether educational necessity justifies Proposition 16).
12. See id. at 692-96 (analyzing plaintiffs' theories why NCAA qualifies as "recipient"
of federal financial assistance).
13. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1998) (prohibiting discrimination in any "program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance").
14. See Cureton 1, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 692 (recognizing that court must decide, as prelimi-
nary matter, whether NCAA is recipient of federal financinl assistance). For clarity purposes,
this Note will often use the term "statutory recipient" as a shorthand reference for an entity that
qualifies as a "program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."
15. See id. at 694 (listing Plaintiff's theories "to support a conclusion that the NCAA is
subject to the reach of Title VI"). The district court also explicitly rejected two of plaintiffs'
theories. Id. at 693-94. First, the district court ruled that the organization's receipt of dues did
not automatically subject the NCAA to suit under Title VL Id. at 693 (citing Nat'l Collegiate
AthleticAss'n v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459 (1999)). Second, the court refused to "pierce the corporate
veil" of the National Youth Sports Program Fund based on an alter-ego theory. Id. at 694.
16. See Cureton I, 37 F. Supp. 2d 687, 694 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (offering first theory that
subjects NCAA to mandate of Title VI); cf Cureton Il, 198 F.3d 107, 118 (3d Cir. 1999)
(finding it unnecessary to determine whether NCAA's relationship with Fund makes organiza-
tion indirect recipient of federal financial assistance). See infra notes 18 and 26 for a more
detailed analysis of the Third Circuit's holding on appeal.
17. See Cureton 1, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 692 n3 (describing Fund as "an enrichment program
for economically disadvantaged youths that provides summer education and sports instruction
on the campuses of NCAA member and non-member institutions of higher education").
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Second, the court found the NCAA subject to Title VI because federally
fimded NCAA member schools granted the organization "controlling author-
ity" over their schools' federally-funded programs."8 The court concluded that
either the "indirect recipient" theory or the "controlling authority" theory
qualified the NCAA as a statutory recipient subject to Title VI's nondiscrimi-
nation requirements.19
The Cureton Iruling is controversial fortwo reasons. First, itis controver-
sial because of its potentially sweeping effects on intercollegiate athletics.2°
Second, it is controversial because of its apparent conflict with the Supreme
Court's holding - only one month earlier - in National Collegiate Athletic
Ass 'n v. Smith.21 In Smith, the Court found that receiving membership dues
18. See id. at 694-96 (emphasizing that NCAA is "the decisionmaking and enforcement
entity behind legislation adopted by, and enforced against its membership"). But see Cureton
H, 198 F3d at 116-18 (ruling that NCAA does not have controlling authority over its members'
programs receiving federal financial assistance). The Cureton H court relied upon the Supreme
Court's decision in National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988), for
the principle that the NCAA does not "control" its members. Idc at 117. The fact that noncom-
plying schools may face sanctions from the NCAA does not change the fact that each school
still makes the ultimate decision regarding who receives scholarships and who participates in
athletics. Id. Each school also has the option of voluntarily withdrawing from the NCAA. Id.
Furthermore, the court reiterated the contractual character of the antidiscrimination regulations
and found it significant that the NCAA was not in a position to accept or reject the federal funds
received by the schools. Id. at 118 (citing United States Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans
ofAm., 477 U.S. 597, 605-06 (1986)).
19. See Cureton I, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 696 (reiterating grounds for holding the NCAA
subject to Title VI).
20. See Mark ConradNC4A 'sProposition 16EligibiliORulesStruck, N.Y.LJ., Mar. 26,
1999, at 5 ("Judge Buchwalter's ruling in Cureton v. NCAA, and his subsequent refusal to stay
the decision throws the college selection process for talented student-athletes in disarray."). The
NCAA eligibility rules affect over one thousand member colleges and universities. Cureton 11,
198 F3d 107, 110 (3d Cir. 1999). Despite the potentially huge impact of its decision, the
district court permanently enjoined the NCAA from continuing the operation of its eligibility
rules contained in Proposition 16. Cureton , 37 F. Supp. 2d 687,715 (E.D. Pa. 1999). How-
ever, the court later modified its order to allow the NCAA to use a grade point average cutoff.
Cureton v. Natl Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 37 F. Supp. 2d 687, 715-17 (E.D. Pa. 1999). In the
same proceeding, the district court denied the NCAA's motion for a stay of the injunction
pending appeal to the Third Circuit Id. at 716-17. The Third Circuit subsequently granted the
stay on March 30,1999 and finally reversed the district court on October 1,1999. Cureton II,
198 F3d 107,118 (3d Cir. 1999).
21. See Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459,468 (1999) (concluding
that NCAA's receipt of dues from federally funded educational institutions was insufficient to
trigger Title IX coverage). In Smith, the Court considered whether the NCAA was subject to
Title IX because it received dues money from federally funded member institutions. Id. at 462.
The plaintiff claimed that the NCAA's failure to waive its rule regarding the athletic ineligibility
of postgraduate students was sex discrimination prohibited by Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972. Id. at 464. Before deciding whether the organization's actions were
discriminatory, the plaintiff first had to show that the NCAA was a recipient of federal financial
57 WASH. &LEEL. REV 1355 (2000)
from federally assisted educational institutions was an insufficient basis for
subjecting the NCAA to Title IX's standards.2 Therefore, the NCAA was not
a statutory recipient.? Finally, the Smith Court articulated its version of
the federal financial assistance standard: "Entities that receive federal assis-
tance, whether directly or through an intermediary, are recipients within the
meaning of Title IX; entities that only benefit economically from federal
assistance are not."'24 Although the Cureton I court acknowledged the Smith
holding,25 the court still found that either the "indirect recipient" theory or the
"controlling authority" theory was a sufficient basis for making the NCAA a
statutory recipient.
26
assistance. Id. at 466. The plaintiff alleged that the NCAA received federal financial assistance
because it received dues from federally-funded member institutions. IM at 465. The Court first
explained that if any part of the NCAA received federal assistance, then the entire organization
would be subject to Title IX. Id. at 466. However, the Court also explained that there is a
crucial distinction between an entity that receives federal assistance and one that merely benefits
economically from such assistance. Id. at 466-69 (citing Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555,
563-70 (1984), and United States Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans ofAm., 477 U.S. 597,
603-12 (1986)). The Court distinguished Grove City because the schools did not pay their
NCAA dues with federal funds earmarked for that purpose. Id. at 468. Instead, the NCAA was
at most a beneficiary of the federal assistance given to its members and not a recipient Id.
22. See id. (distinguishing dues money from kind of earmarked funds involved in Grove
City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555,563-70(1984)). The Smith holding is relevantto the Cureton
analysis because Title IX (at issue in Smith) and Title VI (at issue in Cureton) feature the same
triggering language. An entity is subject to either title if it is a "program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance." See id. at 466 n3 (noting that scope of several federal anti-
discrimination measures is defined in nearly identical terms to those used in Title IX); Cannon
v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694-96 (1979) ("Title IX was patterned after Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. Except for the substitution of the word 'sex' in Title IX to replace the
words 'race, color, or national origin' in Title VI, the two statutes use identical language to
describe the benefited class .... ."). In Cannon, the Court explained that "[t]he drafte of Title
IX explicitly assumed that it would be interpreted and applied as Title VI had been during the
preceding eight years." Id. at 696. The primary difference is that Title IX covers only "educa-
tional" programs or activities. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1998) (prohibiting sex discrimination
"under any education program or activity receiving federal financial assistance"(emphasis
added)); DianeM. Piche, Note, Grove City College v. Bell andProgram-Specifcity: Narrowing
the Scope of Federal Civil Rights Statutes, 34 CATI U. L. REV. 1087, 1088 n2 (1985)
("[C]ongress passed [TJitle X, a measure patterned word-for-word after [T]itle VI but limited
in scope to education.").
23. See infra Part IILA.3 (explaining effect of Smith on definition of statutory recipient).
24. See Smith, 525 U.S. at 468 (emphasis added) (interpreting Department of Education's
definition of "recipient" in light of Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984), and United
StatesDepartaent of Transportation v. Paralyzed Veterans ofAmerica, 477 U.S. 597 (1986)).
25. See Cureton , 37 F. Supp. 2d 687, 693 (ED. Pa. 1999) (discussing application of
National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Smith, 119 S. Ct. 924 (1999)). The Cureton I court rea-
soned that plaintiffs could still use the dues theory in combination with other theories in order
to establish Title VI coverage. Id. at 693-94.
26. Cureton 1, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 696. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text
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The harm the Cureton Icourt was trying to correct may indeed fall withm
the original purpose of Title VI as articulated by President John F. Kennedy.'
However, Title VI was not intended to apply to all "discriminators.112 Instead,
Title VI applies only to those programs or activities that receive federal finan-
cial assistance.' More succinctly, Title VI applies only to statutory recip-
ients. 30
(detailing theories accepted in Cureton I that subject NCAA to Title VI coverage); see also
Cureton E, 198 F.3d 107,114-15 (3d Cir. 1999) (concluding that disparate treatment regulations
passed under authority of Title VI remain program-specific and therefore only apply to NCAA's
use of funds within National Youth Sports Program - funds not at issue in case). In Cureton H,
the Third Circuit considered whether the NCAA was subject to the discriminatory impact
prohibitions of Title VI according to the theories approved of in the district court opinion. Id.
at 114-18. First, the court found it unnecessary to determine whether a federal grant to fund the
NCAA's National Youth Sports Program made the entire organization a recipient of federal
financial assistance because it ruled that the regulations regarding disparate impact were
program-specific. Id at 114. Because the plaintiffs did not allege discrimination in the precise
program or activity alleged to receive federal financial assistance - the National Youth Sports
Program Fund - their claims had to fail. Id. at 115. Because of the program-specific limitation,
the court did not review the merits of the "indirect recipient" theory suggested by the district
court. Id. at 116 ("[E]ven if the NCAA directly received the Federal financial assistance paid to
the Fund our result would be the same."). The court next rejected the second theory proffered
by the district court - that the NCAA enjoyed controlling authority over programs or activities
receiving federal financial assistance. Id. at 116-18 (noting that each school still makes ultimate
decision regarding who receives scholarships and who participates in athletics). Furthermore,
the court reiterated the contractual character of the antidiscrimination regulations. Id. at 118
(citing United States Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am-, 477 U.S. 597, 605-06
(1986). The court found it significant that the NCAAwas not in a position to accept or reject the
federal funds received by the schools. Id. at 118 (citing Davis v. Monroe County Bd. ofEduc.,
526 U.S. 629,637-41 (1999)).
27. See 133 CoNG. REc. S2353 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1987) (statement of Sen. Kerry)
("'Simple justice requires that public funds, to which all taxpayers of all races contribute, not be
spent in any fashion which encourages, entrenches, subsidizes or results in racial discrimina-
tion.'" (quoting President John F. Kennedy's comments before Congress upon submission of
Civil Rights Act of 1964)). Senator Kery quoted Kennedy during his opening statement
regarding the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987. Id. For a more detailed discussion of the
Act, sec infra Part ILB.2.
28. See Bob Jones Univ. v. Johnson, 396 F. Supp. 597,604 (D.S.C. 1974) (noting that in
message accompanying proposed Civil Rights Act of 1963, President Kennedy challenged
Congress to "pass a single comprehensive provision making it clear that the federal government
is not required under any statute, to furnish any kind of financial assistance - by way of grant,
loan, contract, guaranty, insurance or otherwise - to any program or activity in which racial dis-
crimination occurs" (citing M-R. Doc. No. 88-124, at 12 (1963))). In fact, the final version ofthe
Actexcluded contracts ofinsuranceand guarantyfrom coverage. See42U.S.C. §2000d-4 (1998).
29. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1998) ("No person in the United States shall, on the ground
of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.").
30. See supra note 14 (explaining this Note's shorthand use of "statutory recipient").
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The Smith Court asserted that a statutory recipient is more than a mere
"beneficiary" of such assistance; however, the Court failed to articulate any
specific factors to help lower courts distinguish between a recipient and a
beneficiary.3' The absence of a more specific definition of statutory recipient
burdens lower courts, and also frustrates organizations unsure of their poten-
tial recipient status.3 2 Unfortunately, after Smith, the ultimate issue concerm-
ing both courts and organizations remains unanswered: What are the charac-
teristics of an entity that is a statutory recipient of federal financial assistance
as opposed to the characteristics of an entity that is a mere beneficiary of
federal financial assistance?
33
The answer to this question is important because it impacts other areas
of federal legislation beyond Title VI; several subsequent federal antidiscrim-
ination measures also feature the same "Federal financial assistance" trigger.?
4
31. See Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459,467-68 (1999) (stating
distinction between recipient and beneficiary); infra Part IIIA.2 (explaining Smith Court's
interpretation of recipient versus beneficiary standard).
32. See Brief for Petitioner at 35, Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459
(1999) (No. 98-84) (arguing that "to extend Title IX to the NCAA would have broad implica-
tions beyond the NCAA and even Title IX"). Petitioner in Smith noted that "[i]n addition to the
NCAA, there are hundreds if not thousands of private organizations and associations that do not
themselves receive federal financial assistance, but have members - including colleges and
universities, hospitals, and public contractors - that do." Id. For example, petitioner in Smith
listed 126 organizations with higher education institutions as members. Id. (citing 1 ENCYCLO-
PEDIA OF ASSOCIATIONS (Christian Maurer & Tara E. Sheets eds., 34th ed. 1998); HIGHER
EDUCAIONPUBLICATIONS,INC., 1998 HIGHEREDUCATIOND.ECTORY(1997)). Organizations
listed included: the American Association of Christian Schools, the Association of American
Medical Colleges, the Law School Admission Council, the National Consortium for Black
Professional Development, and The College Board. Id. at 1-4(a).
The organizations may take comfort in two other Supreme Court rulings. First, the
Supreme Court already rjected one view that would make various industries and institutions
part of a federally assisted program or activity merely because they are "inextricably inter-
twined" with a recipient of federal financial assistance. See United States Dep't of Transp. v.
Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597, 610-11 (1986) (expressing concern that appellate
court's view of recipient would broaden scope of § 504 of Rehabilitation Act beyond Con-
gress's intent). Also the Supreme Court recently recognized the importance of notice before
sanctions can be imposed upon a recipient of federal financial assistance. See Gebser v. Lago
Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 289 (1998) ("It would be unsound, we think, for a
statute' s express system of enforcement to require notice to the recipient and an opportunity to
come into voluntary compliance while ajudicially implied system of enforcement permits sub-
stantial liability without regard to the recipient's knowledge or its corrective actions upon
receiving notice." (citation omitted)).
33. See Smith, 525 U.S. at 467-68 (stating categorical distinction between recipients and
beneficiaries of federal financial assistance); infra Part IILA2 (explaining Smith Court's
interpretation of recipient versus beneficiary standard).
34. See Smith, 525 U.S. at 466 n.3 (noting that nearly identical terms define scope of
several federal anti-discrimination measures). The Supreme Court listed Section 601 of Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000d (prohibiting race discrimination in "any
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Statutes explicitly modeled after the Title VI language include Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972,35 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973,36 and Section 303 of the Age Discrimination Act of 1975. 3' Applying
the reasoning in Smith to the other statutes modeled after Title VI, a statutory
recipient of federal financial assistance is subject to lawsuits based on race,
gender, disability, or age discrimination.38 In contrast, a mere beneficiary of
federal financial assistance is not subject to these same lawsuits.39
This Note examines the definition of statutory recipient as it applies to
Title VI and the three other nondiscrimination statutes featuring the same
triggering language.' Part H.A discusses the historical development of the
"Federal financial assistance" language as contained in the nondiscrimination
statts.4 Part II.B interprets the initial attempts of Congress and the Su-
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance"), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (prohibiting discrimination on basis of disability in "any program
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance"), and Section 303 of the Age Discrimination
Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. § 6102 (prohibiting discrimination on basis of age in "any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance"). Id
35. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1998) ("No person in the United States shall, on the basis
of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimi-
nation under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance ...
infra notes 66-69 and accompanying text (detailing development of Title IX legislation).
36. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1998) ("No otherwise qualified individual with a disability
in the United States ... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the
participation in, be denied the benefits of or be subjected to discrimination under any program
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. ... ").
37. See 42 U.S.C. § 6102 (1998) ("[N]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of
age, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimina-
tion under, any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.").
38. See Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459, 467-68 (1999) (distin-
guishing between "recipient" and "beneficiary" of federal financial assistance (citing Grove City
Coil. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984), and United States Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans
of Am., 477 U.S. 597 (1986))). The Smith Court explained that entities merely benefiting
economically from federal assistance are not recipients within the meaning of Title IX. Id.
Because the other nondiscrimination statutes contain the same triggering language, entities that
merely benefit from federal assistance would not be recipients for purposes of those statutes
either. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1998) (prohibiting race discrimination in "any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance"); 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1998) (prohibiting
discrimination on basis of disability in "any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance"); 42 U.S.C. § 6102 (1998) (prohibiting discrimination on basis of age in "any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance").
39. See Smith, 525 U.S. at 467-68 (articulating difference between "recipient" and "bene-
ficia y").
40. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1998) (Title VI); 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1998) (Title IX); 29
U.S.C. § 794(a) (1998) (Section 504 of Rehabilitation Act); 42 U.S.C. § 6102 (1998) (Section
303 ofAge Discrimination Act).
41. See infra PartH1A (discussing chronological development ofnondiscrimination statutes
featuring "program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance" triggering language).
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preme Court to actually define "program or activity" receiving federal finan-
cial assistance.42 Part III.A then analyzes the Supreme Court's refinement of
its early definition.43 Part II.B synthesizes lower courts' attempts to apply
Supreme Court precedent to various factual situations.' In doing so, Part
lIH.B identifies the specific inconsistencies between the lower courts' methods
and the general problems with the law as it stands now.45 Part IV proposes
two ultimate categories of statutory recipients - contractual recipients and
intended recipients - that should guide both courts and organizations alike.46
Finally, Part V concludes that the categorical definition of statutory recipient
in Part IV accomplishes the goals of the nondiscrimination statutes better than
the current distinction between a recipient and a beneficiary.47
ff. Historical Development of "Federal Financial Assistance"Law
The four statutes detailed below represent Congress's consolidated
effort to ensure that federal funds do not operate as a government subsidy for
discrimination.45 The statutes' basic structures include three relevant parts:
a triggering phrase,49 a prohibition of discrimination," and a remedial pro-
vision.51 What the statutes' structures do not include is a definition section.52
In the absence of a definition section, the United States Supreme Court and
Congress initially battled over the meaning of "program or activity" as con-
tained in the statutes' triggering language.53 However, even after this initial
42. See infra Part IB (interpreting early congressional and Supreme Court efforts to
define "receiving Federal financial assistance").
43. See infra Part I-A (analyzing Supreme Court's refinement of early definition of
"receiving Federal financial assistance").
44. See infra Part UI.B (synthesizing lower courts' attempts to apply Supreme Court
precedent in "receiving Federal financial assistance" context).
45. See infra Part HBI (identifying lower court inconsistencies and outlining general
problems with current state of law regarding what it means to "receive" federal financial assis-
tance).
46. See infra Part IV (proposing two categories of recipient).
47. See infra Part V (concluding that proposed categories define statutory recipient better
than current recipient versus beneficiary standard).
48. See supra note 40 (citing statutes prohibiting discrimination on basis of race, color,
national origin, sex, disability, and age).
49. See supra notes 29, 35-37 (citing statutes prohibiting discrimination on basis of race,
color, national origin, sex, disabflity, and age).
50. See infra Part RA.1 (discussing nondiscrimination demands of statutes).
51. See infra Part 11A2 (analyzing remedial provisions ofnondiscrimination statutes).
52. See supra notes 29, 35-37 (citing statutes prohibiting discrimination on basis of race,
color, national origin, sex, disability, and age).
53. See infra Part ILB (detailing battle between Supreme Court and Congress over appro-
priate definition of "program or activity").
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exchange, the overall definition of statutory recipient still remained un-
clear.84
A. Statutory Beginnings
Congress first created the "program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance" trigger in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."5 Congress
used the same triggering language in subsequent measures prohibiting dis-
crimination on the basis of sex, age, and disability.55 At no point did Congress
define statutory recipient.
1. Statutory Demands
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination on the
basis of race, color, or national origin in any "program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance."" Congress passed Title VI with two main
objectives in mind. First, Congress wanted to prevent the use of federal funds
to support racial discriminatiom5 Second, Congress sought to provide indi-
viduals with a private remedy for discrimination.59
Despite its good intentions, Congress initially failed to define three key
terms in the act: "program or activity, "receiving, '61 and "Federal financial
54. See supra note 14 (explaining this Note's use of"statutory recipient").
55. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1998) ("No person in the United States shall, on the ground
of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.").
56. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1998) (Title IX); 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1998) (§ 504 of
Rehabilitation Act); 42 U.S.C. § 6102 (1998) (§ 303 ofAge Discrimination Act).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1998).
58. See 110 CONG. REC. 7062 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Pastore) ("[T]he purpose of Title
VI is to make sure that funds of the United States are not used to support racial discrimina-
tion."). Congress also may have enacted Title VI out of a sense of constitutional duty. See
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 285 (1978) ("[S]upporters of Title VI
repeatedly declared that [Title VI] enacted Constitutional principles.").
59. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979) (reiterating that "[Con-
gress] wanted to provide individual citizens effective protection against [discriminatory] prac-
tices" (citing remarks ofRep. Lindsay, 110 CONG. REC. 7062 (1964))). Representative Lindsay
remarked:
This bill is designed for the protection of individuals. When an individual is
wronged he can invoke the protection to himself; but if he is unable to do so
because of economic distress or because of fear then the federal Government is
authorized to invoke that individual protection for the individual ....
Il at 1540. For a more complete discussion of government and private remedies, see infra Part
MA.2.
60. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1998) (exhibiting absence of definition section); see also
Piche, supra note 22, at 1096 (observing that "Congress did not explicitly define the term
'program or activity' in either [T]itle IX or [T]itle VI"). Congress did, however, later define
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assistance." '62 Nowhere does Congress define the characteristics of a statutory
"program or activity" via the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987. See infra Part II.B.2 (dis-
cussing Civil Rights Restoration Act). The definition of "program or activity" is now codified
in each of the nondiscrimination statutes. See 42 U.S.C. 2000d-4(a) (Section 606 of Title VI),
20 U.S.C. § 1687 (Section 908 of Title IX); 29 U.S.C. § 794(b) (Section 504 of Rehabilitation
Act); 42 U.S.C. § 6107(4) (Section 309 of Age Discrimination Act). This Note, however,
concentrates upon the second definitional problem: "receiving Federal financial assistance." For
a fuller historical discussion of "program or activity" under Title VI and Title IX, see Piche,
supra note 22, at 1096-1111 (detailing various approaches to defining "program or activity"
under Title VI and Title IX).
61. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1998) (exhibiting absence of definition section). Although
Congress initially failed to define "recipient," Congress did subtly limit the reach of the word in
the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 (CRRA). See Rules of Construction ofthe CRRA, Mar.
22, 1988, P.L. 100-259, § 7,102 Stat 31. The Rules ofConstruction provide: "Nothing in the
amendments made by this Act [enacting this section, 20 U.S.C.S. § 1687, and 42 U.S.C.S.
2000d-4a; and amending 29 U.S.C.S. §§ 706 and 794 and 42 U.S.C.S. § 6107] shall be con-
strued to extend the application of the Acts so amended to ultimate beneficiaries of Federal
financial assistance excluded from coverage before the enactment of this Act" Id. Legislative
remarks also indicate Congress's intent to differentiate between a recipient and a beneficiary.
See 133 CONG. REC. S2249 (daily ed. Feb. 19,1987) (remarks of Sen. Chafee). Senator Chafee
explained:
There were numerous concerns that previously introduced versions might broaden
the coverage of these laws beyond their effect prior to the Grove City decision.
These concerns have now been addressed, and the relevant provisions tightened....
There were concerns that the measure would have adverse effect upon persons
whom we never intended to reach. There was a fear, for instance, that comer
grocery storeowners who accept food stamps would be deemed subject to the
Rehabilitation Act and be forced to erect ramps and electric doors in order to
provide equal access under the new legislation. Such concerns have been addressed
in the bill we are introducing today. There is now a specific exemption for small
providers in the language of the statute. Last, there was a concern that food stamp
recipients, students receiving school loans, and farmers operating with federal
subsidies would not be subject to the law, as ultimate beneficiaries of federal funds.
They, too, have now been specifically exempted in the statute.
Id. Agencies later defined the term "recipient" in regulations passed pursuant to the nondiscrim-
ination statues. See 34 C.F.L § 100.13Ci) (1999) (defining "recipient" for purposes of Title IX).
For example, the Office of Civil Rights, Education Division, defined "recipient" as follows:
The term recipient means any State, political subdivision of any State, or instru-
mentality of any State or political subdivision, any public or private agency,
institution, or organization, or other entity, or any individual, in any State, to whom
Federal financial assistance is extended, directly or through another recipient, for
any program, including any successor, assign, or transferee thereof; but such term
does not include any ultimate beneficiary under any such program.
Id. Despite this multidisciplinary approach to defining the term, courts only interpret the actual
triggering language contained in the statutes.
62. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq. (exhibiting absence of definition section). Agencies
later defined the term "Federal financial assistance." See 34 C.F.R. § 100.13(f) (1999) (defining
"Federal financial assistance" for purposes of Title IX). For example, the Office of Civil Rights,
Education Division, defined the term as follows:
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recipient. 3 'The lack of definition for these terms has caused confusion for the
courts and for the parties before them.' Because later statutes suffer from the
same lack of definition, the same type of confusion has proliferated.6'
Congress used the same triggering language only eight years after Title
VI when it enacted Title IX of the Education Amendments of 19 72 .' Con-
gress enacted Title IX in reaction to widespread reports ofpervasive discrimi-
nation against women.' Title IX prohibits sex discrimination in "any educa-
The term Federal financial assistance includes (1) grants and loans of Federal
funds, (2) the grant or donation of Federal property and interests in property, (3) the
detail of Federal personnel, (4) the sale and lease of, and the permission to use (on
other than a casual or transient basis), Federal property or any interest in such
property without consideration or at a nominal consideration, or at a consideration
which is reduced for the purpose of assisting the recipient, or in recognition of the
public interest to be served by such sale or lease to the recipient, and (5) any federal
agreement, arrangement, or other contract which has as one of its purposes the
provision of assistance.
Id.
63. See supra note 14 (explaining this Note's use oftorm "statutory recipient").
64. See infra Part III (analyzing attempts of Supreme Court and lower courts to refine trig-
gering language). Despite this lack of definition, early appellate courts broadly interpreted Title
VI coverage. See, e.g., Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 566-68 (1974) (concluding that fact that
San Francisco school system "receives large amounts of federal financial assistance" demands
compliance with federal bilingual education requirements); Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. v. Lemon,
370 F.2d 847, 852 (5th Cir. 1967) (stating that acceptance of federal funds for construction and
maintenance subjected entire school district to Title VI coverage); Piche, supra note 22, at 1096
n32 (describing appellate courts' tendencies to construe Title VI as requiring institution-wide
coverage when "significant amounts of federal funds were received by a college or school
district").
65. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1998) (prohibiting sex discrimination under "any education
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance"); 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1998) (prohib-
iting discrimination against disabled persons under any "program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance"); 42 U.S.C. § 6102 (1998) (prohibiting age discrimination in any "program
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance").
66. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1998) (prohibiting sex discrimination "under any education
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance").
67. See Piche, supra note 22, at 1087 n.2 (observing that "Congress enacted [Title IX]
against a backdrop of testimony concerning widespread discrimination against women in
education" (citing Discrimination Against Women: Hearings on § 805 of H.R. 16,098 Before
the Special Subcomm. on Education of the House Comm on Education andLabor, 91 st Cong.,
2d Sess. (1970))). Piche further noted that "the hearings were held in conjunction with Con-
gress' consideration of § 805 of HR. 16,098, a bill that would have added the word 'sex' to
§ 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." Id.; see also 117 CONG. REC. 39,252 (1971) (remarks
ofRep. Mfink) (articulating need for legislation against sex discrimination). Representative Mink
explained:
Any college or university which has [a] ... policy which discriminates against
women... is free to do so under [Title X, but suchinstitutions should not be asking
the taxpayers of this country to pay for this kind of discrimination. Millions of
women pay taxes into the Federal treasury and we collectively resent that these funds
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tion program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."' Congress
expressly modeled the statute's triggering language after the language in Title
NI.
6 9
Apparently unaware of the confusion its choice would cause, Congress
once again failed to include a definition section." Thus, Congress left the
Supreme Court with the task of interpreting the triggering terms.71 For exam-
ple, the Supreme Court originally ruled that Title IX covered only the specific
program or activity receiving the federal funding.72 However, later legislation
and case law have muddled the Court's program-specificity ruling. 3 Thus,
should be used for the support of the institutions to which we are denied access.
Id. (cited in Piche, supra note 22, at 1102 n.72).
68. 20U.S.C.§1681(a)(1998). Section 901(a) provides: "No person in the United States
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance...." Id.
69. See Piche, supra note 22, at 1088 n.2 (observing that "tihe legislative history of title
IX indicates that its sponsors intended title IX to be construed and enforced as title VI had
been" (citing Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677,694-96 & n.19 (1979))).
70. See 20 U.S.C. §1681(a) (1998) (exhibiting absence of definition section); see also
Piche, supra note 22, at 1093 ("Moreover, the meaning of 'program or activity' was never
defined by the statute."). However, this time, Congress did find it necessary to include several
explicit exemptions both in the original statute and in several subsequent amendments. See Pub.
L. No. 93-568, § 3(a), 88 Stat 1862 (1974); Pub. L. No. 94-482, Title IV, § 412(a), 90 Stat.
2234 (1976) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a), (aX2) to (aX9) (1988)). The
following entities were excluded from coverage: single-sex institutions currently converting to
dual-sex, Section 901(aX2); institutions for whom Title IX would violate religious tenets,
Section 901(aX3); military schools, Section 901(aX4); traditionally single-sex public institu-
tions, Section 901(aX5); social fraternities, sororities, and voluntary youth service organiza-
tions, Section 901 (aX6); Boys and Girls State conferences, Section 901(aX7); father-son and
mother-daughter activities, Section 901(aX8); and beauty pageant scholarships, Section
901(aX9). Id. Subsequent regulations also excluded textbooks and curricular materials. See
34 C.F.R § 106.42 (1999) (exempting materials from nondiscrimination requirement).
71. See infra Parts II.B-I1I.A (detailing Supreme Court and Congress's efforts to further
define terms within "program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance" trigger). Regu-
lations passed pursuant to Title IX purport to define "recipient" See 34 C.F.R. § 106.2(h)
(1999) (defining recipient as one "to whom Federal financial assistance is extended directly or
through another recipient and which operates an education program or activity which receives
or benefits from such assistance"). However, courts attempting to define statutory recipient
concentrate on the triggering language contained in the statute itself. See Grove City Coll. v.
Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 560-70 (1984) (citing agency definition but interpreting statute's own
triggering language).
72. See Grove Cily, 465 U.S. at 573-74 (concluding that college's receipt of federal grants
from its students "does not trigger institution-wide coverage under Title IX"); see also infra Part
ILB.1 (discussing Grove City decision in more detail).
73. See Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 (CRRA), 102 Stat 28, codified in 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d-4a (Title VI); 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (Title IX); 29 U.S.C. § 794(b) (Rehabilitation Act);
42 U.S.C. § 6107-4 (Age Discrimination Act); see also infra Part I.B.2 (discussing Civil Rights
Restoration Act of 1987 in more detail).
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notwithstanding some judicial attempts at defining "statutory recipient," the
exact meaning remains unclear.
Despite the still unclear meaning of the "program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance" trigger, Congress again used the language in two
later pieces oflegislation. First, Section 504 ofthe Rehabilitation Act of 1973
prohibited discrimination against disabled individuals "under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance."7 4 Second, Section 303 of the
Age Discrimination Act of 1975 prohibited discrimination on the basis of age
"in any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."" Con-
gress modeled both statutes after Title Vl.76 However, no definition of statu-
tory recipient emerged from the latter two statutes either.77
2. Statutory Remedies
Each of-the nondiscrimination statutes features a provision for agency en-
forcement." The enforcement provisions authorize departments and agencies
74. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1998). The nondiscrimination statute provides in relevant
part:
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States, as defined
in section 706(8) of this title, shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be
excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance
or under any program or activity conducted by an Executive agency or by the
United States Postal Service.
Id.
75. See 42 U.S.C. § 6102 (1998). The Act provides in relevant part:
Pursuant to regulations prescribed under section 6103 of this title, and except as
provided by section 6103(b) and section 6103(c) of this title, no person in the
United States shall, on the basis of age, be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under, any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance.
Id.
76. See United States Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597, 600
n.4 (1986) (explaining that "Title VI is the congressional model for subsequently enacted
statutes prohibiting discrimination in federally assisted programs").
77. See supra notes 29, 35-37 (citing statutes exhibiting absence of definition section);
see also supra note 14 (explaining this Note's use of term "statutory recipient").
78. See 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1998) (providing for enforcement of Title IX); 29 U.S.C.
§ 794a (1998) (providing for enforcement of Rehabilitation Act by referencing remedies
available in Title VI of Civil Rights Act of 1964); 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1998) (providing for
enforcement of Title VI); 42 U.S.C. § 6104 (1998) (providing for enforcement of Age Discrimi-
nation Act). For example, 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (Title IX) provides:
Each federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal finan-
cial assistance to any education program or activity, by way of grant, loan, or
contract other than a contract of insurance or guaranty, is authorized and directed
to effectuate the provisions of section 1681 of this title with respect to such pro-
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to issue rules, regulations, and general orders necessary to achieve the objec-
tives of the statutes. 9 Agencies may assure compliance with their demands
in either of two ways. 0 First, the agency may terminate or refuse to grant
assistance to an entity that fails to comply with its requirements."1 Second, the
agency may use "any other means authorized by law," as long as it follows
specific procedures.8 2 In practice, an agency usually requires a written assur-
gram or activity by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability
which shall be consistent with achievement of the objectives of the statute authoriz-
ing the financial assistance in connection with which the action in taken. No such
rule, regulation, or order shall become effective unless and until approved by the
President. Compliance with any requirement adopted pursuant to this section may
be effected (1) by the termination of or refusal to grant or to continue assistance
under such program or activity to any recipient as to whom there has been an
express finding on the record, after opportunity for hearing, of a failure to comply
with such requirement, but such termination or refusal shall be limited to the
particular political entity, or part thereof, or other recipient as to whom such a
finding has been made, and shall be limited in its effect to the particular program,
or part thereof, in which such noncompliance has been so found, or (2) by any other
means authorized by law- Provided, however, That no such action shall be taken
until the department or agency concerned has advised the appropriate person or
persons of the failure to comply with the requirement and has determined that
compliance cannot be secured by voluntary means. In the case of any action
terminating, or refusing to grant or continue, assistance because of failure to comply
with a requirement imposed pursuant to this section, the head of the Federal
department or agency shall file with the committees of the House and Senate having
legislative jurisdiction over the program or activity involved a full written report of
the circumstances and the grounds for such action. No such action shall become
effective until thirty days have elapsed after the filing of such report.
Id.
79. For example, Title IX provides in relevant part:
Each federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal finan-
cial assistance . . . is authorized and directed to effectuate the [statute's]
provisions.., by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability which
shall be consistent with achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the
financial assistance in connection with which the action in taken.
20 U.S.C. § (1682) (1998).
80. See supra note 78 (listing enforcement provisions ofnondiscrimination statutes).
81. See supra note 78 (listing enforcement provisions of nondiscrimination statutes). For
example, 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1998) provides in relevant part:
Compliance with any requirement adopted pursuant to this section may be effected
(1) by the termination of or refusal to grant or to continue assistance under such
program or activity to any recipient as to whom there has been an express finding
on the record, after opportunity for hearing, of a failure to comply with such
requirement....
Id.
82. See supra note 78 (listing enforcement provisions of nondiscrimination statutes). For
example, 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1998) provides in relevant part:
Each federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal finan-
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ance of compliance before issuing any federal assistance.3 Despite their
many avenues of redress, agencies charged with enforcement of the nondis-
crimination statutes remain bound bythe "program or activity receiving Feder-
al financial assistance" trigger.84 The triggering language thus limits agencies'
reach to statutory recipients. s
The federal government is not the only enforcer of the nondiscrimination
statutes.86 Although the nondiscrimination statutes originally contained no
express provision for a private remedy, the courts have consistently implied a
private right of action for persons unlawfully excluded from participation in
federally-funded programs." The potential consequences of agency action are
clear: Failure to comply could result in a refusal of or withdrawal of federal
funds.ss However, the appropriate relieffor private litigants is less clear.8 9 For
cial assistance . . . is authorized and directed to effectuate the [statute's] pro-
visions... (2) by any other means authorized by law: Provided, however, That no
such action shall be taken until the department or agency concerned has advised the
appropriate person or persons of the failure to comply with the requirement and has
determined that compliance cannot be secured by voluntary means. In the case of
any action terminating, or refusing to grant or continue, assistance because of
failure to comply with a requirement imposed pursuant to this section, the head of
the Federal department or agency shall file with the committees of the House and
Senate having legislative jurisdiction over the program or activity involved a full
written report of the circumstances and the grounds for such action. No such action
shal become effective until thirty days have elapsed after the filing of such report.
Id.
83. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.4 (1999) (requiring "Assurance of Compliance"). Section (a)
provides:
Every application for Federal financial assistance for any education program or
activity shall as condition of its approval contain or be accompanied by an assur-
ance from the applicant or recipient, satisfactory to the Assistant Secretary, that
each education program or activity operated by the applicant or recipient and to
which this part applies will be operated in compliance with this part.
Id.; see Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1984) (describing agency procedure
following conclusion that entity is recipient of federal financial assistance).
84. See supra notes 29, 35-37 (listing statutes that use "program or activity receiving Fed-
eral financial assistance" triggering language).
85. See supra note 14 (explaining this Note's use of"statutory recipient")
86. See supra note 78 and accompanying text (listing private enforcement provisions of
each nondiscrimination statute).
87. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 696 (1979) (detailing decisions that
construed Title VI as creating private remedy (citing Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. v. Lemon, 370
F.2d 847, 852 (5th Cir. 1967))). The Cannon Court reasoned further that the words, history,
subject matter, and underlying purposes of Title IX all supported implied private cause of action
for victims of discrimination. Id. at 709.
88. See supra notes 78-85 and accompanying text (discussing government remedies pro-
vided for in nondiscrimination statutes).
89. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 70-76 (1992) (analyzing
appropriate relief for Title VI and Title IX violations).
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example, whether a private litigant is entitled to monetary damages depends
upon the type of discrimination at issue.'
Courts that decide the appropriateness ofprivate monetary relief also con-
sider the nature of the nondiscrimination statutes' status as spending legis-
lation."1 They do so because spending legislation is built around a contractual
relationship between the government and the recipient of the funds.92 In
spending legislation, the government's enforcement power is limited to the
funding recipient. 93 Because the private right of action under the statutes is
likely no broader than the government's enforcement authority thereunder, the
private litigant's enforcement power is also limited to the funding recipient.94
Therefore, no matter what the remedy, neither the government nor a private
litigant may enforce the nondiscrimination statutes against an entity unless that
entity first qualifies as a statutory recipient of federal financial assistance. 9
90. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist, 524 U.S. 274,290 (1998) (holding that
damages remedy will not lie under Title X unless official has actual knowledge of discrimina-
tion in recipient's programs and fails to adequately respond); Franklin, 503 U.S. at 74 (explain-
ing that monetary damages are not available for unintentional violations of nondiscrimination
statutes because "the receiving entity of federal funds lacks notice that it will be liable for a
monetary award" (citing Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981))).
The Supreme Court in Gebser found that allowing private damages when the recipient of federal
funds has no actual knowledge of the discrimination would clash with the central purpose of
requiring notice of the violation followed by an opportunity for voluntary compliance. Gebser,
524 U.S. at 289-90.
91. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 287 ('When Congress attaches conditions to the award of
federal funds under its spending power, U.S. CONST., art I, § 8, cL 1, as it has in Title IX and
Title VI, we examine closely the propriety of private actions holding the recipient liable in
monetary damages for noncompliance with the condition."); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1981) (explaining that typical remedy is termination of federal
funds and not private action for noncompliance). Furthermore, the Supreme Court explicitly
has concluded that Title VI is spending-power legislation. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 598-99 (1983) (citing cases and legislative history as support for Title
VI's status as "a typical 'contractual' spending-power provision").
92. See Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17 (recognizing that "legislation enacted pursuant to the
spending power is much in the nature of a contract: in retur for federal funds, the States agree
to comply with federally imposed conditions"). The Pennhurst Court concluded: "The legit-
imacy of Congress' power to legislate under the spending power thus rests on whether the State
voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the 'contract' Id.; see also 110 CONG. REC.
1542 (remarks of Rep. Lindsay) ("The mandate of Title VI is very simple. Stop the discrimina-
tion, get the money, continue the discrimination, do not get the money.").
93. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629,640-41 (1999) (explaining
that recipient itself must discriminate in order to be liable under Title IX).
94. See Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459,467 n.5 (1999) (suggest-
ing "it would be anomalous to assume that Congress intended the implied private right of action
to proscribe conduct that Government enforcement may not check" (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1682
(1998))).
95. See supra note 14 (explaining this Note's shorthand use of"statutory recipient").
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B. Early Developments in Definitions
Initially, Congress's choice to model each of the later nondiscrimination
statutes after Title VI may have appeared wise.' After all, eliminating
federally-finded discrimination was the goal of each statute, and therefore
Congress had little reason to question using the same language in each subse-
quent statute. However, Congress's repeated failure to define key terms in
the statutes' triggering language made statutory interpretation much more
difficult." For example, inthe mid-1980s, the Supreme Court and Congress
clashed over the definition of "program or activity."" The Supreme Court
limited the term's reach," and Congress acted swiftly to overturn the Court's
decision. 10 The following section details this early definitional disagreement
between the Court and Congress.'°2
1. Grove City College v. Bell
Grove City College v. Bell"°3 marked the United States Supreme Court's
first controversial foray into interpreting the "receiving Federal financial
assistance" triggering language. 1' The Grove City Court considered whether
96. See supra notes 29,35-37 (citing statutes that use same triggering language).
97. See Smith, 525 U.S. at 466 n3 (noting that scope of several antidiscrimination statutes
is defined in "nearly identical terms").
98. See infra Part ILB-] (chronicling Supreme Court and lower court interpretations of
triggering language).
99. See infra Part ILB (describing interaction between Grove City Court and Congress
concerning definition of"program or activity").
100. See infra Part ILB.1 (explaining Supreme Court's program-specific approach to
defining "program or activity").
101. See infra Part ILB.2 (indicating Congress's response to Grove City through Civil
Rights Restoration Act of 1987).
102. See infra notes 103-31 and accompanying text (chronicling battle between Congress
and Supreme Court over appropriate definition of "program or activity").
103. 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
104. See Grove City Coil. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 573-74 (1984) (concluding that college's
indirect receipt of federal student financial aid triggered Title IX coverage but only for precise
program or activity that received aid). In Grove City, the Supreme Court considered whether
Title IX applied to a small liberal arts college, and if so, which programs or activities within the
school were bound by Title IX. Id. at 558. Based on a conclusion that "Grove City was a
'recipient' of 'Federal financial assistance,'" the Department of Education asked the college to
complete an Assurance of Compliance in which it would agree to comply with Title X's ban
on sex discrimination. Id at 560-61. The college refused, and instead suggested that merely
enrolling students who receive federal Basic Educational Opportunity Grants did not subject
the entire institution to Title IX coverage. Iti at 563. The Supreme Court agreed in part, and
disagreed in part, with the school's contention. First, the Court held that the college was subject
to Title IX even though the aid was indirect because Congress perceived no difference between
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a private college qualified as a statutory recipient of federal financial assis-
tane. 5  The Court held that the college's indirect receipt of its students'
federal financial aid did qualify the school as a statutory recipient. 1"a Statu-
tory recipient status triggered Title IX coverage, however, Title IX's prohibi-
tion of sex discrimination covered only the financial aid program itself and not
the rest of the institution.'°
Overall, the Grove City Court attempted to better define statutory recip-
ient of federal financial assistance in two ways. °8 First, the Court limited
"program or activity" to the precise program or activity that received the
aid."° In this case, the program or activity receiving the aid was not the
entire educational institution.n ° Instead, the actual recipient was the school's
financial aid program."' The Court reasoned that to ignore program-specific-
ity would confuse the distinction between an actual recipient and an entity
that merely benefits from assistance.' The Court's program-specific ap-
direct institutional assistance and aid received by a school through its students. Id. at 564-67.
However, receipt of the funds did not trigger institution-wide coverage for two reasons. Id. at
571-74. First, the funds were earmarked specifically for the financial aid program. Id. at 572.
Second, it was not Congress's intent for the entire school to be subject to Title IX because of
one student's grant. See id. at 573 (noting "no persuasive evidence suggesting that Congress
intended that the Department's regulatory authority follow federally aided students from
classroom to classroom, building to building, or activity to activity").
105. See id. at 563-70 (analyzing student grants as source of indirect federal assistance to
college).
106. See id. at 569-70 (reasoning that Congress's intent and administrative construction
mandate conclusion that "Title IX coverage is not foreclosed because federal funds are granted
to Grove City's students rather than directly to one of the College's educational programs").
107. See id. at 573-74 (concluding that grants to students represent federal financial
assistance only to college's financial aid program).
108. See id. at 559-74 (interpreting "program or activity" in way that also limits definition
of other terms in triggering language).
109. See id. at 573-74 (distinguishing between student grants and "unrestricted grants that
institutions may use for whatever purpose they desire"). The program-specific ruling technically
was the second ruling within the opinion. Id.
110. See id. at 573-74 (interpreting Congress's intent).
111. See id. (noting that only college's own financial aid program could be regulated under
Title IX).
112. See id. at 572-73 (articulating potential consequences ofignoring program-specificity).
The Grove Civ Court warned: "Most federal education assistance has economic ripple effects
throughout the aided institution, and it would be difficult, if not impossible, to determine which
programs or activities derive such indirect benefits." Id. at 572. If one eliminates the word "edu-
cationaL, the Grove City Court was a prophetic court. It is the exact task they dreaded - dis-
tinguishing a recipient institution from those entities who merely "benefit" from assistance- that
current courts now face. See injra Part ]ILB (detailing lower courts' attempts to distinguish
between recipient and beneficiary of federal financial assistance).
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proachi" would not require such a detailed "recipient versus beneficiary"
analysis. The line was clear; only the specific receiving program - in this
case, the financial aid program - was subject to Title IX coverage." 4
Second, the Grove City Court refused to limit the definition of statutory
recipient to direct recipients." 5 Instead, indirect recipients of federal aid
could still qualify as statutory recipients ifthey were also the congressionally-
intended recipients of the aid." 6  The Court recognized that the individual
student, and not the college itselt was the direct recipient of federal financial
assistance." 7 However, the language of the grant statute and its legislative
history clearly manifested Congress's intent for the college to be the ultimate
recipient of the aid."" Therefore, the college's financial aid program qualified
as a statutory recipient and thus was bound by the nondiscrimination require-
ments." 9
The Court's choice to include indirect but intended recipients within the
definition of statutory recipient initially may have drawn little attention. 20
However, the definition of indirect recipient eventually would need refining.
121
In the meantime, the Court's limiting interpretation of "program or activity"
attracted most of the immediate attention, especially from Congress." 2
2. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987
Dismayed by the Grove City decision, Congress finally attempted to
define at least one of-the terms in the triggering language."n Congress passed
113. See Grove City Coil. v. Bell, 464 U.S. 555, 573-74 (1984) (articulating program-
specific approach).
114. Id.
115. See id. at 563-70 (considering -whether college received federal financial assistance
via grants to its students).
116. See id. at 565-70 (emphasizing that Congress explicitly intended for college to receive
federal financial assistance).
117. See id. at 559-60 (describing grant statute that provides money to individual students).
118. See I at 564-69 (analyzing grant statute and congressional intent).
119. First, the Supreme Court found no apparent distinction between direct and indirect aid.
See Crove City, 465 U.S. at 564 (noting that "economic effect of direct and indirect assistance
often is undistinguishable"). Second, the Court deferred to the Department of Education regu-
lations that clearly considered student grants to be federal financial assistanceto the schools them-
selves. Id. at 566-68. See supra note 14 (explaining this Note's use of "statutory recipient").
120. See supra note 14 (explaining this Note's use of "statutory recipient").
121. See infra Parts IIlA & B (chronicling efforts of Supreme Court and lower courts to
better refine definition of statutory recipient).
122. See infra Part I.B.2 (describing Congress's effort to redefine "program or activity"
for purposes ofnondiscrimination statutes).
123. See 133 CONG. REC. S2353 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1987) (remarks of Sen. Kerry)
(explaining motivation behind Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987). Senator Kerry warned
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the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 (CRRA) to overturn the Grove City
Court's program-specific interpretation of "program or activity. 124 In doing
so, Congress instead defined "program or activity" to cover the entire institu-
tion and all of its programs."n Congress further provided that this institution-
wide definition would apply to Title IX as well as to the other nondiscriuna-
that "[t]he Supreme Court's decision in... Grove City College v. Bell was a step backward in
the continuing struggle for civil rights in this country." Id.
124. See 133 CONG. REC. S2353 (remarks of Sen. Kerry) (noting that "[tihis legislation
would reverse the Grove City decision and restore full constitutional and civil rights protections
under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments,
Section 504 ofthe 1973 Rehabilitation Act, and the Age Discrimination Act of 1975").
125. See 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1998) (defining "program or activity'). Section 1687 provides:
Interpretation of "program or activity."
For the purposes of this title, the term "program or activity" and "program" mean
all of the operations of-
(A) a department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a
State or of a local government; or
(B) the entity of such State or local government that distributes such assistance and
each such department or agency (and each other State or local government entity)
to which the assistance is extended, in the case of assistance to a State or local
government;
(2XA) a college, university, or other postsecondary institution, or a public system
of higher education; or
(B) a local education agency (as defined in [20 U.S.C.S. § 8801]), system of
vocational education, or other school system;
(3XA) an entire corporation, partnership, or other private organization, or an entire
sole proprietorship -
(i) if assistance is extended to such corporation, partnership, private organiza-
tion, or sole proprietorship as a whole; or
(H) which is principally engaged in the business of providing education, health
care, housing, social services, or parks and recreation; or
(B) the entire plant or other comparable, geographically separate facility to which
Federal financial assistance is extended, in the case of any other corporation, part-
nership, private organization, or sole proprietorship; or
(4) any other entity which is established by two or more of the entities described in
paragraph (1), (2), or (3) any part of which is extended Federal financial assistance,
except that such term does not include any operation of an entity which is con-
trolled by a religious organization if the application of section 1681 of this title to
such operation would not be consistent with the religious tenets of such organiza-
tion.
Id.; see 133 CONG. REC. S2249 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1987) (remarks of Rep. Boschwitz).
Representative Boschwitz announced:
I have chosen to cosponsor this bill because it would amend our civil rights laws
to define "program or activity" in a way that makes it very clear than an entire
institution is covered when any part of the institution received federal funds. This
would clearly restore these laws to their original intent
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tion statutes featuring the now familiar triggering language of "program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance."126
The CRRA definition provides that if any part of an entity receives
federal money, all operations ofthat entity then are subject to the nondiscrimi-
nation demands of civil rights legislation.1 7 In statutory recipient terms, if
any program or activity within an entity receives federal financial assistance,
then the entire entity qualifies as a statutory recipient." Overall, the idea
appears both simple and admirable. The application of the definition, how-
ever, proved both difficult' 9 and potentially unconstitutional)
3°
XI. Refinement ofDefinitions
Although the CRRA resolved the issue of Congress's intent concerning
the reach of "program or activity," the other terms featured in the statutes'
triggering language remained undefined.3 For example, defining what it
means to "receive" federal financial assistance proved to be an especially
126. See 133 CONG. REC. S2353 (daily ed. Feb. 19,1987) (Sen. Kerry) ("This legislation
would ... restore full Constitutional and Civil Rights protections under Title VI of the 1964
Civil Rights Act, Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments, Section 504 of the 1973
Rehabilitation Act and the Age Discrimination Act of 1975.").
127. See 20 U.S.C. § 1687, Findings of Congress, Pub. L. No. 100-259 (explaining
Congress's inspiration). Section 2 provided:
The Congress finds that-
"(1) certain aspects of recent decisions and opinions of the Supreme Court have
unduly narrowed or cast doubt upon the broad application of title IX of the Educa-
tion Amendments of 1972 [20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.], section 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973 [29 U.S.C. 794], the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 [42 U.S.C.
6101 et seq.], and title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. 2000d et.
seq.] and
"(2) legislative action is necessary to restore the prior consistent and long-standing
executive branch interpretation and broad, institution-wide application of those
laws as previously administered."
Id.; see 133 CONG. REC. S2249 (remarks of Sen. Kennedy). Senator Kennedy stated:
That basic principle - that the Federal Government should not do business with
those who violate its law or allow public tax dollars to underwrite discrimination -
is as valid today as it was in 1961. Congress must act in this bicentennial year to
clarify these laws and reaffirm our commitment to end discrimination in federally
assisted institutions.
Id.
128. See supra note 14 (explaining this Note's use of "statutory recipient").
129. See infra Parts I.A & B (detailing lower courts' problems).
130. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional limits of
spending legislation).
131. See supra Part ILB (chronicling interaction between Supreme Court and Congress
concerning definition of "program or activity").
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troublesome task. 32 In its interpretation of "receive," the Supreme Court
ultimately drew a line between a "recipient" and a "beneficiary"; the nondis-
crimination statutes would cover the former, but not the latter.133  Lower
courts, however, found the recipient versus beneficiary distinction difficult to
apply in some situations " and completely inadequate in others. 35 The
following subpart details the Supreme Court's and lower courts' efforts to
refine the definition of statutory recipient for purposes of the nondiscrimina-
tion statutes.
36
A. Supreme Court Refining
While Congress battled to rework the definition ofprogram or activity, 
13
the Supreme Court struggled over defiing "recipient."'38 The Court initially
laid down a "recipient versus beneficiary" distinction it hoped would guide
lower courts. 39 However, over a decade passed before the Court applied its
own distinction in an effort to provide better guidance.
4°
1. United States Department of Transportation v. Paralyzed
Veterans of America
Subsequent to Congressional fiddling, United States Department of
Transportation v. Paralyzed Veterans ofAmerica'4' emerged as the Supreme
Court's primary interpretation of what it means to "receive" federal financial
assistance 42 In Paralyed Veterans, the Court concluded that because com-
132. See infra Part IILB (discussing courts' attempts to refine definition).
133. See United States Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans ofAm., 477 U.S. 597, 606
(1986) (criticizing argument for confusing "intended beneficiaries with intended recipients");
infra Part ILA.I (discussing Parazed Veterans in more detail).
134. See infra Part IILB.1 (discussing problems with lower court approaches to applying
Supreme Court definition).
135. See infra Part ILB.2 (describing problems with lower court attempts to redefine scope
ofnondiscrimination statutes via controlling authority theory).
136. See supra notes 29,35-37 (listing nondiscrimination statutes); see also supra note 14
(explaining this Note's use of "statutory recipient").
137. See supra PartILB.2 (discussing development of Civil Rights Restoration Act of1987).
138. See infra Part IILA (discussing Supreme Court's attempts to refine definition of recip-
ient through "recipient versus beneficiary" standard).
139. See infra Part hEAl (analyzing United StatesDepariment of Transportation v. Para-
lyzed Veterans ofAmerica, 477 U.S. 597 (1986)).
140. See infra Part IfA.2 (analyzing National CollegiateAthleticAss'n v. Smith, 525 U.S.
459 (1999)).
141. 477 U.S. 597 (1986).
142. See United States Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans ofAm., 477 U.S. 597, 607
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mercial airlines did not receive federal financial assistance, Section 504 ofthe
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 143 did not cover the airlines' activities.'" The
airlines were not statutory recipients because they did not directly receive the
federal grant money directed to airport operators through the grant statute145
Instead, Congress specifically mandated that the funds for airport develop-
ment and planning were to goto the airport operators. 4 Therefore, the opera-
tors, and not the airlines, were the only statutory recipients of federal financial
assistance.1 47
(1986) (concluding that Section 504 of Rehabilitation Act is applicable to airport operators but
not to commercial airlines). In Paralyzed Veterans, the Supreme Court considered whether
commercial airlines were subject to the nondiscrimination demands of Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Id. at 599. The airlines would be subject to Section 504's prohibi-
tion of discrimination against handicapped persons only if they qualified as a program or
activity receiving federal financial assistance. I& at 604. Plaintiffs suggested two potential
grounds for subjecting the airlines to Section 504 coverage: (1) federal grants to airport
operators pursuant to the Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970, and (2) government
operation of a nationwide air traffic control system. IM at 599. In its analysis of the federal
grant theory, the Court first identified the "recipient" of the federal assistance. It at 604-05.
The Court examined the underlying grant statute and Congress's intent to conclude that the
recipient of the fRnds was the airport operators and not its users. Id. at 605. In doing so, the
Court emphasized the contractual nature of Section 504. Id. The Court also rejected the notion
that the airlines were "indirect recipients" of the grant money because operators converted the
cash into structures that benefit airlines, for example runways. Id. at 606. Instead, the Court
emphasized the distinction between "intended beneficiariea" and "intended recipients." Id. at
606-07. Finally, the Court also disagreed with the Court of Appeals's conclusion that the
airlines are "part of a federally assisted program of 'commercial air transportation." I& at 610-
11. The Court rejected plaintiffs' second theory - the air traffic control theory - rather quickly.
Id. at 611-12. The Court reasoned that the system is not "federal financial assistance." Id. at
612. Instead, "it is a federally conducted program that has many beneficiaries but no recipi-
ents." Id. Overall, the Court concluded that none of plaintiffs' theories subjected the commer-
cial airlines to Section 504; the airlines are beneficiaries of assistance and not recipients. Id.
143. See 29 US.C. § 794(a) (1998). The nondiscrimination statute provides in relevant
part:
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States, as defined
in section 706(8) of this tite, shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be
excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance
or under any program or activity conducted by an Executive agency or by the
United States Postal Service.
Id.
144. See Paralyzed Veterans, 477 U.S. at 604-12 (entertaining yet ultimately rejecting
series of theories making commercial airlines recipients of federal financial assistance).
145. See id at 604-06 (analyzing Airport and Airway DevelopmentAct of 1970 goveming
disbursement of federal funds for airport projects).
146. See id. at 605 (noting that "[n]ot a single penny ofthe money is given to the airlines").
147. See id. (identifying recipient of funds).
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In reaching the conclusion that airlines did not receive federal funds, the
Court emphasized the contractual nature of Section 504.149 The Court ex-
plained that statutory recipients of federal funds under Title VI Title IX, and
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act enter into a contractual relationship with
Congress. 49 An entity that accepts Congress's offer of funds does so knowing
that receipt ofthose funds will subject it to coverage under the nondiscrimina-
tion statutes.1 50 However, in Paralyzed Veterans, the commercial airlines
were not in a position to accept or reject the nondiscrimination obligations
imposed.' Instead, only the actual airport operators were in such a posi-
tion. s2 Therefore, only the airports, and not the airlines, qualified as statutory
recipients.1
53
The contractual question did not end the inquiry. Rather, the Court next
addressed whether the commercial airlines were "indirect recipients" of federal
financial assistance as defined in Grove City College v. Bell. 54 The Court
rejected the indirect recipient theory as inapplicable to the kind of federal
financial assistance involved. 5 Although the Grove City Court observed "no
distinction between direct and indirect aid," that observation was limited to
detennining whom Congress intended to receive the fderal money.' 56 Thus,
for example, it was clear in Grove City that the government used the direct
recipient - the student - as an intermediary to the indirect yet intended recipi-
ent - the college's financial aid program. 57 In Paralyzed Veterans, however,
148. See id. at 604-06 (noting that Congress limited scope to recipients because "it sought
to impose § 504 coverage as a form of contractual cost of the recipient's agreement to accept
the federal funds").
149. See id. at 605-06 (citing Soberal-Pcez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36,41 (2d Cir. 1983)).
The Heckler court explained: "Under the program-specific statutes, Title VI, Title IX, and
§ 504, Congress enters into an arrangement in the nature of a contract with the recipients of the
funds: the recipient's acceptance of the funds triggers coverage under the nondiscrimination
provision." Id. The Court's omission of § 303 of the Age Discrimination Act is likely inadver-
tent
150. United States Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597, 605-06
(1986).
151. See id. at 606 (explaining that Congress obligates only those parties "in a position to
accept or reject those [nondiscrimination] obligations as a part of the decision whether or not
to 'receive' federal funds").
152. See id. (noting that "the only parties in that position are the airport operators").
153. See supra note 14 (explaining this Note's use of "statutory recipient").
154. See Paralyzed Veterans, 477 U.S. at 606-07 (explaining difference between benefi-
ciary and recipient (citing Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555,564-65,572 (1984))).
155. See id. at 606-11 (rejecting indirect aid as basis for statutory recipient status).
156. Id. at 606 (citing Grove City, 465 U.S. at 564).
157. See id. at 606-07 (explaining that in Grove City intended recipient was college and
not individual students).
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Congress did not use the direct recipient- the airport operator- as aninterme-
diary to the commercial airlines. Instead, the direct recipient - the airport
operator - was also the only intended recipient. 5 ' The airlines only benefited
from the federal funding; they did not receive it.159 Therefore, the airlines
failed to qualify as statutory recipients.16 Overall, the Paralyzed Veterans
Court clarified the Grove City Court's definition of indirect recipient: An
indirect recipient qualifies as a statutory recipient only if Congress intended for
that recipient to be the ultimate recipient. 6' Although the Court announced
that 'tthe key is to identify the recipient," the process for identifying an indirect
yet intended recipient remained unclear.
62
In addition to clarifying the definition of indirect recipient, the Paralyzed
Veterans Court also provided a basic analytical framework for the statutory
158. See id. at 606-07 (emphasizing Congress's intent in application of Grove City Court's
indirect recipient theory).
159. See id. at 607 (concluding that "statute covers those who receive the aid, but does not
extend as far as those who benefit from it"). In fact, the Grove City Court explicitly recognized
the distinction between a recipient and a beneficiary. See id. (distinguishing "'economic ripple
effects"' from direct federal assistance (citing Grove City, 465 U.S. at 572)).
160. See supra note 14 (explaining this Note's use of"statutory recipient"). The Parayzed
Veterans Court rejected two other potential theories that would subject the commercial airlines
to the nondiscrimination provisions of Section 504. See United States Dep't of Transp. v.
Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597, 610-12 (1986) (rejecting "inextricably intertwined"
theory and beneficiaries of air traffic control system theory as bases for Section 504 coverage).
First, plaintiffs suggested that because airports and airlines are "inextricably intertwined" in a
commercial air transportation system, the airlines are subject to coverage. Id. at 610-11. The
Court rejected the argument because such an interpretation of the Section 504 triggering
language would clearly exceed the scope intended by Congress. See id. at 611 (offering analogy
to illustrate dangers of court of appeals's theory). The Court criticized the slippery slope
tendencies of the "inextricably intertwined" theory because various unintended industries and
institutions would become parts of federally assisted programs or activities. Id. at 610. The
Court elaborated:
For example, Congress... has engaged in a mammoth program of interstate high-
way construction and maintenance .... If we accepted the ["inextricably inter-
twined" theory], we would also be compelled to conclude that industries that
depend on the federally funded highways for their existence, such as trucking firms
and delivery services, are part of a program or activity of national highway trans-
portation.
Id. at 610-11. Second, the plaintiffs asserted that the commercial airlines use of the air traffic
control system also qualified them as recipients of federal financial assistance. Id. at 611. The
Court also rejected this theory. Id. at 612. The air traffic control system was not a grant from
Congress to the commercial airlines. Id Instead, the system is a public program with many
beneficiaries. Id. at 612 (quoting legislative history of Title VI for support).
161. See United States Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans ofAm., 477 U.S. 597, 606-
07 (1986) (emphasizing importance of intent element in statutory recipient inquiry).
162. Id. at 607.
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recipient inquiry.1' Under this framework, one first must identify the recipi-
ent of the aid.'" To answer this inquiry, one should look to the underlying
grant statute to determine whom Congress intended to benefit. 65 Second, one
should ask whether the candidate for statutory recipient status had an opportu-
nity to accept or reject the funds in question.166 This inquiry is necessary
because the various nondiscrimination statutes all contemplate a contractual
arrangement./67 In the contract, statutory recipients exchange a promise not
to discriminate for federal funds.168
Other than this limited guidance, Paralyzed Veterans offers only a
nondescript, yet supposedly crucial, distinction: One must find some way to
draw the line between a recipient and a beneficiary. 69 The nondiscrimination
statutes bind recipients of federal financial assistants; they do not bind benefi-
ciaries of that same assistance. 7 Unfortunately, neither the Supreme Court
nor the lower courts have come to any consensus about how to distinguish
between a recipient and a beneficiary.' 7 '
163. See id. at 604-06 (detailing steps used to determine whether commercial airlines
receive federal financial assistance).
164. See id. at 604 (suggesting that one must "[a]t the outset... identify the recipient of
the federal assistance").
165. See id. (looking first to terms of underlying grant statute, i.e., Airport and Airway
Improvement Act of 1982). Congress made it "explicitly clear" that funds were for airport
operators and not for airlines. Id. at 605.
166. See id. at 606 (explaining that Congress only obligates those "in a position to accept
or reject those obligations as a part of the decision whether or not to 'receive' federal funds");
see also Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist, 524 U.S. 274,286 (1998) (reasoning that Title
IX "condition[s] an offer of federal funding on a promise by the recipient not to discriminate,
in what amounts essentially to a contract between the Govemment and the recipient of federal
funds").
167. See United States Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597,605
(1986) (noting that "Congress enters into an arrangement in the nature of a contract with the
recipients of the funds").
168. See id. at 605 (noting that "the recipient's acceptance of the funds triggers cover-
age"). Furthermore, "'Congress apparently determined that it would require contractors and
grantees to bear the costs of providing employment for the handicapped as a quidpro quo for
the receipt of federal funds.'" Id. (quoting Consol. Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 633
n.13 (1984)).
169. See id. at 607 ("Congress tied the regulatory authority to those programs or activ-
ities that receive federal financial assistance; the key is to identify the recipient of that assis-
tance.").
170. Id.
171. See infra Part MlIB (outlining lower courts' attempts to apply "recipient versus bene-
ficiary" standard).
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2. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Smith
In National Collegiate Athletic Ass 'n v. Smith,'72 the United States Su-
preme Court finally revisited the definition of statutory recipient.173 The Court
concluded that a private organization with federally-fimded members did not
qualify as a statutory recipient.174 The athletic association's mere receipt of
dues from its federally-assisted members did not trigger Title IX coverage. 7'
In reaching its conclusion, the Court had to distinguish dues paid by
federally-assisted member colleges from the monies paid to colleges by the
federally-assisted students in Grove City.176 In Grove City, federally-funded
students paid their tuition to the college with federal money specifically ear-
marked for that purpose; the money was granted to the students, but intended
for the schools.'77 Therefore, the college was a statutory recipient of federal
financial assistance and thus was subject to Title IX.1'78 In contrast, federally-
funded NCAA member schools paid their dues to the organization, but they
did not pay their dues with federal funds earmarked specifically for that
purpose; Congress did not have NCAA dues in mind when it granted the
schools money. 79 Therefore, the NCAA was not a statutory recipient of
federal financial assistance.50 Instead, the organization's receipt of dues
merely demonstrated that it "indirectly benefits from the federal assistance
afforded its members."'18 Finally, the Court reiterated the test gleaned from
172. 525 U.S. 459 (1999).
173. See Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459,470 (1999) (concluding
that receipt of dues from member institutions did not subject organization to Title IX coverage).
For a more complete case summay of Smith, see supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text




177. See Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555,575-76 (1984) (concluding that college's
acceptance of money from students' federal tuition grants subjected college financial aid
program to Title IX). The Grove City Court emphasized the "powerful evidence of Congress'
intent" as a basis for its holding. Id. at 569-70. For example, the Court noted that "'provid[ing]
assistance to institutions of higher education'" was one of the stated purposes of the student aid
provisions. IaM at 565-66.
178. See id. at 569-70 (concluding that "Title IX coverage is not foreclosed because federal
funds are granted to Grove City's students rather than directly to one of the College's educa-
tional programs").
179. See Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459, 468 (1999) (explaining
that "[u]nlike the earnarked student aid in Grove City, there is no allegation that NCAA
members paid their dues with federal funds earmarked for that purpose").
180. See supra note 14 (explaining this Note's use of "statutory recipient").
181. Smith, 525 U.S. at468.
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Grove City and Paralyzed Veterans: "Entities that receive federal assistance,
whether directly or through an intermediary, are [statutory recipients]; entities
that only benefit economically from federal assistance are not.11
82
Although the Smith Court found the dues theory unpersuasive, it did not
conclusively eliminate the possibility that some other reasoning could still
subject the NCAA to coverage.e In its final footnote, the Court mentioned
the NCAA's relationship with the National Youth Sports Program Fund ("the
Fund") as a possible ground for classifying the NCAA as a statutory
recipient.1 4 Two district courts and the Department of Health and Human
Services previously had suggested that the NCAA was a statutory recipient
because of the NCAA's relationship with the Fund' 8 5 However, instead of
offering its analysis of this potential source of federal financial assistance, the
Supreme Court ruled that it could not address issues not decided in the courts
below. 8 6 Overall, the Smith Court added no other factors or levels of analysis
to an already vague "recipient versus beneficiary" test.'
3. Summary
Although the above chronological interplay between congressional legis-
lation and Supreme Court interpretation leaves several specific questions
unanswered, one distinction emerges as definite. The demands of the nondis-
crimination statutes - Title VI, Title IX, Section 504 ofthe Rehabilitation Act,
and Section 303 ofAge DiscriminationAct- applyto all "recipients" offederal
financial assistance, but do not apply to mere "beneficiaries."'18 8 Although
Congress and the Court provide few, if any, specific factors to distinguish
between the two categories, some common principles do spring forth. Two
specific categories of entities automatically qualify as statutory recipients. 9
182. Id.
183. See id. at 469 n.7 (acknowledging alternative theories).
184. Id.
185. Id. (citing Bowers v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n., 9 F. Supp. 2d 460,494 (D.NJ.
1998) (denying NCAA's motion for summary judgment in Rehabilitation Act suit because
"there are genuine questions of material fact as to whether the NCAA receives federal funds
through the [National Youth Sports Program Fund]"); Cureton v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic
Ass'n, No. 97-131, 1997 WL 634376, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct 9,1997) (refusing NCAA's motion
for summary judgment in Title VI action)).
186. Smith, 525 U.S. at470.
187. See id at 467-69 (stating test).
188. See id. at 468 (explaining that those who "only benefit economically from federal assis-
tance" are not recipients within meaning of Title IX); United States Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed
Veterans ofAm., 477 U.S. 597,609-10 (1986) (distinguishing recipient and beneficiary).
189. See supra note 14 (explaining this Note's use of "statutory recipient").
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First, any entity explicitly designated as a recipient in a federal grant statute
obviously qualifies as a statutory recipient."9 Second, an indirect recipient of
federal financial assistance may qualify as a statutory recipient if Congress
intended it as the ultimate recipient."9
If the entity does not fit into either of those categories, the "recipient
versus beneficiary" analysis becomes complicated.'9 The only principles
provided may be best understood in the negative; certain characteristics alone
fail to subject an entity to the nondiscrimination statutes. First, an entity that
does not share a contractual relationship with the federal government may not
qualify as a statutory recipient.Irs Second, an entity that only receives dues
from federally-funded members may not qualify as a statutory recipient. 94
Instead, such creatures are mere beneficiaries of federal funds and thus are not
bound by the nondiscrimination statutes. 95 Unfortunately, the murky issues
in the "recipient versus beneficiary" debate make it difficult for lower courts
to determine whether an entity is a statutory recipient./9
B. Lower Courts'Interpretations
Not surprisingly, lower courts faced with the task of distinguishing
between a recipient and a beneficiary have produced a quagmire of case law
190. SeeParayzed Veterans, 477 U.S. at 604 (examining terms of underlying grant statute
to identify explicit recipient). Furthermore, regulations require direct recipients of federal finan-
cial assistance to file a written assurance of compliance upon application for funding. See 34
C.FL § 100A (1999) (describing assurances required of applicants for federal financial assis-
tance). Section 100A provides, in relevant part
Every application for Federal financial assistance... shall, as a condition to its
approval and the extension of any Federal financial assistance pursuant to the
application, contain or be accompanied by an assurance that the program will be
conducted or the facility operated in compliance with all requirements imposed by
or pursuant to this part.
Id.
191. See Paralyzed Veterans, 477 U.S. at 606-07 (explaining that "Grove City stands for
the proposition that Title IX coverage extends to Congress' intended recipient"); Grove City
Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 565-66 (1984) (considering evidence of Congress's intent).
192. See Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459, 468 (1999) (explaining
that Title IX covers recipients of federal financial assistance but does not cover "entities that
only benefit economically from federal assistance").
193. See supra notes 148-52 and accompanying text (detailing emphasis on contractual
relationship between government and recipient of funds).
194. See supra Part ILA.2 (describing rule in Smith).
195. See supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text (differentiating between recipient and
benefliciary).
196. See infra Part IlI.B (analyzing lower courts' interpretations of Supreme Court recip-
ient versus beneficiary standard).
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laced with conclusory statements and little consistency.19 To the courts'
credit, Congress and the Supreme Court have provided only a few tools with
which to work: two definite categories of statutory recipients19 and two
vague, general factors to emphasize. 99 However, despite the confusion, two
common approaches have emerged as most favored.2 'c
First, courts purport to apply the general principles drawn from Grove
City and Paralyzed Veterans to determine whether an entity is an indirect
intended recipient."' However, the problem with this approach is that courts
faced with similar factual scenarios, applying the same vague principles, have
reached opposite results.2" Second, some lower courts have abandoned or de-
emphasized the "recipient versus beneficiary" distinction altogether.203 In-
stead, those courts have found alternative grounds for determining that an
entity shouldbe subject to the nondiscrimination statutes; 2 4 they argue that an
197. See infra Parts BlLB.1-3 (describing lower courts' approaches to recipient versus
beneficiary analysis).
198. See supra notes 189-91 and accompanying text (describing direct and intended
indirect recipients).
199. See supra notes 193-95 and accompanying text (discussing contractual relationship
and receipt of dues as potential principles in recipient versus beneficiary distinction).
200. See infra Part 1ll.B.1-3 (describing approaches).
201. See generally United States Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans ofAm., 477 U.S.
597 (1986) (drawing distinction between recipient and beneficiary); Grove City Coll. v. Bell,
465 U.S. 555 (1984) (discussing indirect recipient).
202. Compare Homer v. Ky. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 43 F3d 265,272 (6th Cir. 1994)
(concluding that high school athletic association is recipient of federal financial assistance
because it is school board's agent) with Yellow Springs Exempted Vill. Sch. Dist Bd. of Educ.
v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 647 F.2d 651, 656 (6th Cir. 1981) (concluding that high
school athletic association is not recipient of federal funds); see also infra Part IIB.1 (describ-
ing and critiquing lower courts' application of indirect recipient theory).
203. See Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 80 F. Supp. 2d 729, 735
(W.D. Mich. 2000) (concluding that Title IX's antidiscrimination rule applies to any entity with
controlling authority over program or activity receiving federal financial assistance even if entity
does not receive federal funds). The Communifiesfor Equity court rejected the athletic associa-
tion's argument that "only recipients of federal finds are subject to Title IX" because that inter-
pretation "is at odds with the plain meaning and purpose of the statute." Id. at 733. The court
thought such a restrictive interpretation was "empty formalism" because it "would allow entities
that controlled [federal] funds to discriminate so long as those entities were not themselves
'recipients."' Id. at 734; see infra Part IIT3.2 (describing and critiquing controlling authority
theory).
204. See Kemether v. Pa. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, No. 96-6986, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17331, at *45-52 (ED. Pa. Nov. 8,1999) (citing Cureton , 37 F. Supp. 2d 687 (1999),
in support of "controlling authority" theory). The Kemether court also found the high school
association subject to Title IX because it was an "assignee" under the definition of recipient in
Department of Education regulations. Id. at 52-53.
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entity that exercises "controlling authority" over a statutory recipient should
also qualify as a statutory recipient."0
1. Indirect Recipient
Lower courts have attempted to apply Supreme Court precedent to deter-
mine whether an entity qualifies as a statutory recipient of federal financial
assistance.2 °' Unfortunately, their attempts to applythe general principles from
Grove City and Paralyzed Veterans have led to mixed results.'" The most




The indirect recipient theory grew out of Grove City College v. Bell.
2
1
The Grove City Court concluded that the college's financial aid program was
a statutory recipient bound by Title IX because the college indirectly received
federal assistance through federal grants to some of its students.21° Because
Title IX did not limit its coverage only to direct recipients, the fact that the
college did not receive an actual check from the federal government was not
determinative."' Instead, Title IX's inclusive terminology demanded a broad
sweep of coverage.
212
205. See supra note 14 (explaining this Note's use of "statutory recipient"); see also infra
Part IILB=2 (describing and critiquing controlling authority theory).
206. See infra note 220 and accompanying text (listing cases in which courts applied
indirect recipient theory).
207. See infra Part IILB.1 & 2 (chronicling and critiquing lower courts' approaches).
208. See supra notes 115-19 and accompanying text (describing indirect recipient theory
utilized in Grove City); see also infra Part IILB.1 (describing and critiquing lower courts'
approaches).
209. See supra Part lB.1 (discussing Grove City decision in more detail).
210. See Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555,569-70 (1984) (determining that Congress
intended for college to be recipient). Despite classifying the college as an indirect recipient of
federal financial assistance for purposes of Title IX the Court limited the Title's coverage to
the specific "program or activity" receiving the aid. See id. at 573 (finding "no persuasive evi-
dence suggesting that Congress intended that the Department's regulatory authority follow
federally aided students from classroom to classroom, building to building, or activity to
activity"). The Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 subsequently reversed the program-specific
approach taken by the Court in Grove City. See supra Part ILB.2. Congress instead mandated
that receipt of federal funding by any education program or activity triggered institution-wide
coverage. Grove City, 465 U.S. at 573-74.
211. See Grove City, 465 U.S. at 563-70 (analyzing potential effects of college's receipt
of Basic Educational Opportunity Grants); see also supra Part ILB.1 (discussing Grove City
decision in more detail).
212. See Grove City, 465 U.S. at 564 (recognizing need to "'accord [Title IX] a sweep as
broad as its language'" (citing North Haven Bd. of Edue. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 512, 521 (1982))).
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If the reasoning stopped there, the indirect recipient theory would appear
quite broad. However, as the Court in Paralyzed Veterans explained, Grove
City does not stand for the principle that any indirect recipient qualifies as a
statutory recipient.213 Instead, it stands for the principle that an indirect recip-
ient qualifies as a statutory recipient only if it is also the intended recipient.214
For example, the college program qualified as a statutory recipient because
Congress intended for the college program to be the eventual recipient of the
funds.21 Because of the student's unusual status as a mere intermediary of the
aid, the indirect recipient - the college program - qualified as a statutory
recipient.216 In contrast, a commercial airline that merely benefited from fed-
eral assistance to airport operators did not qualify as a statutory recipient.2"
The operators were not mere conduits for the airlines. 8 The airline may have
benefited indirectly from the aid to the operators, but it was not the congres-
sionally-intended recipient of the aid.
219
Despite the Supreme Court's limiting interpretation of the indirect recip-
ient theory, lower courts still subject entities to the nondiscrimination statutes
on that basis; they conclude that an indirect recipient is also a statutory
recipient. 220 For example, in Cureton I, the district court determined that the
First, the face of the statute supported "no distinction between direct and indirect aid." Id.
Second, Congress evidenced no intent to distinguish between direct and indirect assistance. Id.
at 565-70. Congress was aware 'that the student assistance programs established by the amend-
ments would significantly aid colleges and universities. In fact, one of the stated purposes of
the student aid provisions was to 'provid[e] assistance to institutions of higher education.'" Id.
213. See United States Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans ofAm., 477 U.S. 597, 607
(1986) (reasoning that "[Grove City] does not stand for the proposition that federal coverage
follows the aid past the recipient to those who merely benefit from the aid").
214. See id. at 606-07 (explaining that "[i]twas clearin Grove Cit that Congress' intended
recipient was the college, not the individual students to whom the checks were sent from the
Government").
215. Id.
216. See id. at 607 (reiterating that "[ilt was this unusual disbursement pattern of money
from the Government through an intermediary (the students) to the intended recipient that
caused us to recognize that federal financial assistance could be received indirectly").
217. Id. at 607; see also supra note 14 (explaining this Note's use of "statutory recipient").
218. Parayzed Veterans, 477 U.S. at 607.
219. See id. (reasoning that "it is clear that the airlines do not actually receive the aid; they
only benefit from the airports' use of the aid").
220. See Dupre v. Roman Catholic Church, No. 97-3716, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13799,
at *13 (E.D. La. Sept 2,1999) (rejecting argument "based on the perceived distinction between
direct and indirect aid"). The Dupre court disregarded the fact that the Catholic school
defendant received federal funds through the school board rather than "being paid to it by the
United States directly." Id. at *15. Thus, the school's receipt of federal financial assistance
through the school board "trigger[ed] the antidiscrimination prohibitions against the disabled
[in the Rehabilitation Act]." Id. at *16; see also Sandison v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n,
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defendant athletic association was a statutory recipient because it was an
indirect recipient of federal funds. u The athletic association did not receive
a direct grant from the federal goverment, however, it did indirectly receive
federal assistance through a grant to a separate corporation with which it was
affiliated - the Fund. 2 Although the federal grant explicitly named the Fund
as the recipient, the court ruled that the Fund- like the student in Grove City -
was "merely a conduit" for the ultimate recipient organization.2 Thus, the
athletic association qualified as a statutory recipient. 2 4
b. The Critique
The indirect recipient theory appears doctrinally sound and supported by
precedent. 2 However, lower courts' application of the indirect recipient
863 F. Supp. 483,487 (ED. Mich. 1994) (concluding that "[a]lthough MHSAA is not a direct
recipient of federal funding, it is subject to the Rehabilitation Act because it receives federal
funds indirectly"); Pottgen v. Mo. State High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 857 F. Supp. 654,663 (ED.
Mo. 1994) (concluding that high school athletic association "is a 'federally-assisted program'
within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act, as it receives federal funds indirectly through its
members, which delegate to it a portion of their responsibilities for regulation of interscholastic
activities" (citing Jacobson v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 1984)).
Furthermore, at least one court took the indirect recipient theory a step further and concluded
that an "assignee" could also qualify as a statutory recipient See Kemether v. Pa. Inter-
scholastic Athletic Ass'n, No. 96-6986, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17331, at *53 (E.D. Pa. Nov.
8, 1999) (fitting defendant within broad definition of assignee as contained in regulation's
definition of recipient for Title IX purposes (citing 34 C.F.R. § 106.2(h) (1992))); see also
supra note 14 (explaining this Note's use of "statutory recipient").
221. See Cureton , 37 F. Supp. 2d 687, 694 (ED. Pa. 1999) (concluding that because
"NCAA exercises effective control and operation," organization is "to be construed as an
indirect recipient of federal financial assistance").
222. See Cureton 1, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 694 (emphasizing that Fund was "ultimately being
controlled by the NCAA"). The grant at issue in Cureton I and H was a Community Services
Block Grant from the United States Department of Health and Human Services. See id.
(describing grant arrangement). The National Youth Sports Program (NYSP) "is a youth
enrichment program that provides summer education and sports instruction on NCAA member
and non-member institution campuses." Cureton I1, 198 F.3d 107, 110 (3d Cir. 1999). The
federal funds were at one time advanced to the NCAA. Id However, "[iun 1989, the NYSP
Fund (the "Fund") was established as a nonprofit corporation to administer the NYSP." Id.
"Since 1992, the department has granted the financial aid intended for the NYSP directly to the
Fund. The Fund is regarded as anNCAA 'affiliate.'" Id.
223. See Cureton 1, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 694 (emphasizing that NCAA makes all decisions
about Fund and use of federal funds).
224. Id.; see also supra note 14 (explaining this Note's use of "statutory recipient").
225. See United States Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans ofAm., 477 U.S. 597, 604-
07 (1986) (reiterating intent element of Grove City indirect recipient theory); Grove City Coll.
v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 564-70 (1984) (accepting college's receipt of indirect aid through its
students as basis for statutory recipient status).
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theory is problematic for two main reasons - vertical inconsistency and hor-
izontal inconsistency22 6 First, lower courts' application is vertically inconsis-
tent because they often misapply the theory as limited by the Supreme
Court.= They categorize indirect recipients as statutory recipients without
asking whether the indirect recipient was also the intended recipient." The
Paralyzed Veterans Court dictated that the indirect recipient theory depended
upon Congress's intent; an indirect recipient qualifies as a statutory recipient
only if it was also Congress's intended recipient.' A failure to inquire into
Congress's intent is thus one crucial flaw in the lower courts' application of
the indirect recipient theory.
The second flaw with the indirect recipient theory is horizontal inconsis-
tency; lower courts disagree with each other on the application of the theory
to similar fact patterns. A comparison of two very similar cases with very
different results illustrates the horizontal inconsistency problem.' 0 An issue
arose concerning whether a bank that made loans guaranteed with federal
funds qualifies as a statutory recipient for purposes of the Rehabilitation
Act." Plaintiffs in two cases argued that the bank was an indirect recipient
and therefore subject to coverage under the nondiscrimination statutes as a
statutory recipient.23 2 One court explained that Section 504 coverage did not
226. See infra notes 228-37 and accompanying text (detailing inconsistencies in lower
courts' application of indirect recipient theory).
227. See supra note 220 (citing oases that omit intent element from indirect recipient
theory). But see Cureton H, 198 F3d at 116 (observing that "(t]he case law suggests that the
critical inquiry in determining whether an entity is an indirect recipient of Federal financial
assistance is whether that entity is the intended indirect recipient of Federal fuAds, intention
being from Congress's point of view" (citing Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 563-65 &
n.13 (1984))).
228. See supra note 220 (citing cases that omit intent inquiry). But see Moreno v. Consol.
Rail Corp., 99 F.3d 782, 787 (6th Cir. 1996) (concluding that railroads were subject to nondis-
crimination demands even though funds were distributed to states first). The Moreno court
explained that the railroads had "to comply with the nondiscrimination regulations for federally
assisted programs" because they were the intended recipients of the funds. Id.
229. See Parazed Veterans, 477 U.S. at 606 (remarking that indirect aid inquiry should
be made in context of determining whom Congress intended to receive federal money).
230. Compare Gallagher v. Croghan Colonial Bank, 89 F.3d 275, 278 (6th Cir. 1996)
(concluding that bank did not receive federal financial assistance by disbursing federal student
loans) with Moore v. Sun Bank, 923 F.2d 1423, 1432 (11th Cir. 1991) (deriving opposite
conclusions from similar fact pattern). Gallagher involved a bank's participation in a federal
student loan program. Gallagher, 89 F3d at 277. Moore concerned a bank's participation in
a Small Business Administration guaranteed loan program. Moore, 923 F.2d at 1425.
231. See Gallagher, 89 F.3d at 277 (involving bank's participation in federal student loan
program); cf Moore, 923 F.2d at 1425 (concerning bank's participation in Small Business
Administration guaranteed loan program).
232. Gallagher, 89 F.3d at 277. Plaintiff argued that the bank received federal funds as
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extend past the direct recipient - the borrower - to the indirect recipient - the
bank. 3 In a similar case, another court reached the opposite conclusion."
That court determined that Section 504 coverage did indeed extend past the
direct recipient - the borrower - to the bank.235 This example illustrates that
although Grove City and Paralyzed Veterans limited the reach of the indirect
recipient category to Congress's intent, the standard remains sufficiently
vague that courts' broad interpretations have led to disparate results.2?5
2. Controlling Authority
In addition to fitting entities into a previously defined category such as
"indirect recipient," lower courts also have outlined another theory for subject-
ing an entity to the nondiscrimination statutes - "controlling authority." 7
These courts do not feel that the "indirect recipient" and the "recipient versus
beneficiary" distinctions sufficiently define the appropriate coverage of the
direct compensation for making student loans at below market interest rates. It The Gallagher
court explicitly rejected the reasoning inMoore. Ma at 278.
233. See id. at 278 (explaining how coverage under nondiscrimination statute "does not
follow federal aid 'past the intended recipient to those who merely derive a benefit from the aid
or receive compensation for services rendered pursuant to a contractual arrangement'"(quoting
Hamilton v. m. Cent. R.. Co., 894 F. Supp. 1014, 1022 (S.D. Mss. 1995))).
234. See Moore, 923 F.2d at 1431-33 (concluding that bank was recipient of federal
financial assistance and thus subject to coverage under Rehabilitation Act).
235. See id. at 1432 (explaining how coverage under nondiscrimination act does cover
banks receiving federal default reimbursements on federally guaranteed loans).
236. See supra Part ILB.1 (discussing Grove City in more detail); supra Part I.A.1
(discussing Paralyzed Veterans in more detail).
237. See, e.g., Homer v. Ky. High Sch. AthleticAss'n, 43 F.3d 265,272 (6th Cir. 1994)
(emphasizing that school board "controls and manages" schools and programs on behalf of
recipient of federal funds and that it has exercised its authority "with respect to a number of
federal financial assistance programs"); Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n,
80 F. Supp. 2d 729, 733 (WiD. Mich. 2000) (concluding that "any entity which has controlling
authority over a 'program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance' is subject to Title
IX's anti-discrimination rule, even if that entity does not itself receive the federal funds which
finance the program or activity"); Kemether v. Pa. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, No. 96-6986,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17331, at *45-52 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 8,1999) (finding "controlling author-
ity" over express recipients of federal financial assistance sufficient basis for holding entity
subject to Title IX (citing Cureton , 37 F. Supp. 2d 687, 687, 689, 695 (E.D. Pa. 1999)));
Sandison v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 863 F. Supp. 483,487 (ED. Mich. 1994) (reason-
ing that association is subject to Rehabilitation Act because (1) schools and buildings where
association carries out its functions receive federal assistance, and (2) coaches in association-
sponsored competitions are employees of recipients); Pottgen v. Mo. State High Sch. Activities
Ass'n, 857 F. Supp. 654, 663 (ED. Mo. 1994) (finding high school athletic association subject
to Rehabilitation Act in part because its members "delegate to it a portion of their responsibili-
ties for regulation of interscholastic activities").
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nondiscrimination statutes." Therefore, they extend statutory coverage to
entities that exercise controlling authority over a statutory recipient. 9 Al-
though the goal of extending the prohibitions on discrimination may be desir-
able, the controlling authority theory is problematic for multiple reasons.
240
a. The Theory
The theory appears simple: If a direct recipient of federal financial
assistance cedes controlling authority over its federally-flmded program to
another entity, then that entity is subject to the nondiscrimination statutes.241
As a corollary to the controlling authority inquiry, some courts ask whether
the entity in question performs or has taken over the statutory duties of the
recipient of federal financial assistance 42
238. See Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 80 F. Supp. 2d 729,733
(W.D. Mich. 2000) (reasoning that nothing on face of Title IX limits class of potential defen-
dants to recipients).
239. See Kemether v. Pa. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, No. 96-6986, 1999 U.S. Dist
LEXIS 17331, at *48 (concluding that high school athletic association was bound by Title IX
because federally funded schools "ceded [it] controlling authority").
240. See infra Part IILB.2.b (detailing problems with lower courts' extension of nondis-
crimination statutes' coverage).
241. See Cureton , 37 F. Supp. 2d 687, 694 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (deciding that "NCAA is
subject to suit under Title VI irrespective of whether it receives federal funds, directly or
indirectly, because member schools (who themselves indisputably receive federal funds) have
ceded controlling authority over federally funded programs to the NCAA"). In Cureton I, the
NCAA argued that its constitution expressly states that "the control and responsibility for the
conduct of the intercollegiate athletics shall be exercised by the institution itself." Id. at 695.
The court recognized that a school is technically free to choose not to abide by NCAA legisla-
tion. Id. However, the court noted that such a school would either suffer serious sanctions from
the organization or be forced out of the organization altogether. Id. at 695-96. Overall, the
court found it significant that "[members] granted to the NCAA the authority to promulgate
rules ... that the members are obligated to abide by and enforce." Id. at 696. On appeal, the
Third Circuit disagreed. Cureton I, 198 F3d 107,116-18 (3d Cir. 1999). The Third Circuit
did not reject "controlling authority" as a theory itself however, it did reject the theory's
application to the NCAA. Id. The "controlling authority" theory did not apply to the NCAA
because the NCAA does not actually control its members. Id. at 117 (citing Nat'l Collegiate
Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988)). Instead, the ultimate decision regarding
students' athletic participation still belongs to the member schools. Id. For instance, "[t]he fact
that the institutions make these decisions cognizant ofNCAA sanctions does not mean that the
NCAA controls them, because they have the option, albeit unpalatable, of risking sanctions or
voluntarily withdrawing from the NCAA." Id. Furthermore, the schools still "decide what
applicants to admit, what employees to hire, and what facilities to acquire." Id. at 118.
242. See Homer v. Ky. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 43 F.3d 265, 272 (6th Cir. 1994)
(considering delegation of duties in statutory recipient inquiry); Graham v. Tenn. Secondary
Sch. Athletic Ass'n, No. 1:95-CV-044, 1995 WL 115890, at *11 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 20, 1995)
(concluding that school athletic association was subject to Title VI because direct recipient of
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The obvious problem with the controlling authority theory is that the two
words do not appear anywhere in the nondiscrimination statutes' triggering
language.2 43 Lower courts have thus chosen one of two approaches to bring
the controlling authority theory within the language of the statutes.2 " Some
courts simply equate controlling authority with statutory recipient status.245
Other courts conclude that coverage under the nondiscrimination statutes is
not necessarily limited only to statutory recipients.2'
The latter group cites the "plain meaning and purpose" ofthe nondiscrim-
ination statutes in support of its broad interpretation. 7 These courts do not
view the words "receiving Federal financial assistance" as triggering language
that restricts the application of the statutes requirements only to statutory
recipients.4 Instead, these courts characterize the nondiscrimination statutes
as providing remedies for those individuals discriminated against in the
"operation" of programs receiving federal aid.2" This approach provides
plaintiffs with the remedy Congress intended and prevents direct recipients
from avoiding liability simply by transferring control over their programs to
nonrecipients.2
0
funds delegated responsibility "to supervise and regulate the athletic activities in which [the
schools] of Tennessee participate on an interscholastic basis").
243. See supra notes 29, 35-37 (citing statutes without "controlling authority" language).
244. See infra notes 245-46 (listing cases).
245. See, e.g., Kemether v. Pa. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, No. 96-6986, 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 17331, at *46-47 (ED. Pa. Nov. 8, 1999) (ruling that athletic association qualifies
as recipient under Title IX); Homer, 43 F.3d at 271-72 (refusing summary judgment on
recipient ground because entity exercised statutory authority); Sandison v. Mich. High Sch.
Athletic Ass'n, 863 F. Supp. 483, 487 (ED. Mich. 1994) (classifying association as indirect
recipient of federal financial assistance under Rehabilitation Act).
246. See Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 80 F. Supp. 2d 729, 733
(W.D. Mich. 2000) (refusing to limit Title IX coverage to "recipients" of federal funds).
247. See id. (rejecting argument that only recipients of federal funds are subject to Title IX
because that interpretation would be "at odds with the plain meaning and purpose of the
statute").
248. See id. (interpreting § 902 of Title IX). The Communities court acknowledged that
Supreme Court precedent implies that Title IX will be triggered only if the defendant is a
recipient of federal financial assistance. Id. at 732 (citing Grove City Coil. v. Bell, 465 U.S.
555 (1984); United States Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans ofAm., 477 U.S. 597 (1986)).
However, the court found this interpretation at odds with Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441
U.S. 677 (1979). Id. at 733.
249. See id. at 733-34 (citing Cannon, 441 U.S. at 691-92).
250. See id. at 734 (reasoning that limiting Title IX coverage to "recipients" of federal
funds "would allow entities that controlled those funds to discriminate so long as those entities
were not themselves 'recipients'").
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b. The Critique
Although the lower courts' goal of preventing "pass the buck" discrimi-
nation is indeed laudable, the controlling authority distinction is problematic
for several reasons."' First, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the "con-
trolling authority" language has no basis in the statutes." 2 The statutes'
triggering language provides for coverage under a program or activity that
receives federal financial assistance. 3 It does not purport to cover an entity
that exercises controlling authority over a program or activity receiving such
assistance.25
The second problem with the controlling authority theory is that it
clashes with Congress's intent." The remedies provided for under the non-
discrimination statutes do not contemplate a "controlling authority" defend-
ant.? 6 Furthermore, language in the CRRA conflicts with reading "controlling
authority" into the statutes. 7 In the CRRA, Congress included a rule of
construction that forbid extending the application of the act to ultimate bene-
ficiaries of assistance."5 To judicially add a "controlling authority" trigger in
light of the CRRA and the remedial provisions, therefore, would frustrate
Congress's intent.
Third, the controlling authority theory fails from a practical application
standpoint. Courts have had enough trouble interpreting the "recipient versus
beneficiary" distinction without a definition of statutory recipient. 9 An
inquiry into whether an entity exercises controlling authority absent any statu-
tory definition of the term only invites more confusion and disagreement in
the lower courts.
251. See infra notes 253-63 and accompanying text (detailing problems).
252. See supra notes 29, 35-37 (citing statutes without "controlling authority" language).
This point is more significant considering that the "starting point of any inquiry into the
application of a statute is the language of the statute itself." Paralyzed Veterans of Am, 477
U.S. at 604 (citing Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330,337 (1979)).
253. See supra notes 29, 35-37 (citing statutes that feature almost identical triggering
language).
254. See supra notes 29, 35-37 (citing statutes that feature almost identical triggering
language).
255. See infra notes 257-59 and accompanying text (describing intent).
256. See supra Part II.A2 (analyzing statutory remedies).
257. See Rules of Construction of the CRRA, Mar. 22,1988, P.L. 100-259, § 7, 102 Stat
31 (providing that nothing in Act's amendments "shall be construed to extend the application
of the Acts so amended to ultimate beneficiaries of Federal financial assistance excluded from
coverage before the enactment of this Act").
258. Id.
259. See supra Part ILB.1 (detailing lower courts' application of recipient versus benefi-
ciary standard).
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Fourth, the controlling authority theory fails to provide the notice that
spending legislation constitutionally compels.' The Supreme Court has
recently reiterated the notice requirement in the context of Title IX.261 Sub-
jecting an entity to the nondiscrimination statutes without notice of its obliga-
tions would frustrate both the statutes' protective purpose and the statutes'
remedial scheme.'
3. Summary
The "indirect recipienf' and "controlling authority" rationales serve as
lower courts' responses to the general lack of Supreme Court guidance regard-
ing whether an entity is subject to the nondiscrimination statutes. 3 The
Court handed down and has since reiterated a supposed distinction between
a recipient and a beneficiary, but has yet to delineate any clear factors to
distinguish between the two categories. 264 The lack of standards becomes an
even greater problem once one considers the significant duties attendant to
recipient status.w
Although the Supreme Court's definition of statutory recipient needs
refining, lower courts' reliance upon the above two theories to supplement the
Supreme Court's definition of statutory recipient is misplaced.' First, the
courts' reliance upon the indirect recipient theory is troublesome because
courts either omit the necessary intent inquiry or they disagree about the
theory's application.' Furthermore, the courts' reliance upon the controlling
authority theory signals its own whole new set of problems.' In light of both
260. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text (examining nature ofnondiscriminaion
statutes as spending legislation).
261. See Gebserv. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist, 524 U.S. 274,287-91 (1998) (precluding
award of monetary relief absent notice); see also supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text
(further describing significance of spending legislation).
262. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 289-90 (reasoning that it would be unsound for statute's
enforcement system to require notice and still permit liability without regard to recipient's
knowledge); see also supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text (further describing significance
of spending legislation).
263. See supra Parts IILB.1 & UL.B2 (analyzing theories).
264. See Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459,467 (1999) (endorsing
recipient versus beneficiary standard); United States Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of
Am., 477 U.S. 597,606 (1986) (distinguishing between recipient and beneficiary).
265. See supra Part HA (describing duties).
266. See supra Parts D1LB.l.b & IILB.2.b (critiquing lower courts' approaches).
267. See supra notes 227-37 and accompanying text (highlighting vertical and horizontal
inconsistencies with lower courts' approaches).
268. See supra notes 244-63 and accompanying text (detailing list of problems with con-
trolling authority theory as independent basis for coverage under nondiscrimination statutes).
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the current problems with the "recipient versus beneficiary" standard and the
lower courts' problematic refinement of that standard, the United States
Supreme Court has two options: It may articulate some factors to help lower
courts distinguish between a recipient and a beneficiary, or it may redefine
statutory recipient. Tins Note suggests the latter option.5 9
IV Proposed Categories
The need for a clear articulation of who qualifies as a recipient of federal
financial assistance is certain. The potential duties linked with statutory recip-
ient status are considerable.2 ° If an entity qualifies as a recipient, it must
abide by the nondiscrimination demands of four major pieces of legislation."
If the entity's actions fall short of the nondiscrimination provisions, either the
government or private individuals may take serious action against the entity.272
The current "recipient versus beneficiary" standard provides an insuffi-
cient definition of statutory recipient for two broad reasons. First, lower court
approaches have resulted in both vertical and horizontal inconsistency; lower
courts either misapplythe standard as defined bythe Supreme Court, 3 orthey
disagree with each other about the appropriate application of the standard.
274
Second, some lower courts have already found the "recipient versus benefi-
ciary" standard insufficient.275 These courts have supplemented the standard
with their own theory: controlling authorityY 6  The controlling authority
theory provides that an entity is a statutory recipient if it exercises "controlling
authority" over a direct recipient of federal financial assistance.? 7 However,
the problems with the controlling authority theory include its potential clash
with statutory language and Congress's intent, its difficulty in application, and
its failure to provide entities with notice of their statutory recipient statusY
269. See infra Part IV (proposing new categorical definition of statutory recipient).
270. See supra Part ILA (describing duties triggered by statutory recipient status).
271. See supra Part ILA.1 (explaining statutory demands).
272. See supra Part ILA.2 (explaining statutory remedies).
273. See supra notes 228-30 and accompanying text (detailing vertical inconsistency).
274. See supra notes 231-37 and accompanying text (detailing horizontal inconsistency).
275. See supra Part IILB.2 (describing and analyzing lower courts' reliance upon "control-
ling authority" as basis for coverage under nondiscrimination statutes).
276. See supra Part IILB.2.a (describing controlling authority theory).
277. See Cureton , 37 F. Supp. 2d 687, 694 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (deciding that "NCAA is
subject to suit under Title VI irrespective of whether it receives federal funds, directly or in-
directly, because member schools (who themselves indisputably receive federal funds) have
ceded controlling authority over federally funded programs to the NCAA"); see also supra Part
mnJ3.2.a (describing controlling authority theory in more detail).
278. See Part IIl.B.2.b (listing problems within critique of controlling authority theory).
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Several organizations like the NCAA await the Supreme Court's position on
the controlling authority theory." 9 Regardless of its eventual decision, both
the potential consequences of statutory recipient status and lower court con-
fusion over the definition demand a better definition of statutory recipient for
purposes of the nondiscrimination statutes."
This Note suggests a two-part solutionto the definition problem." t First,
the Court should abandon, or at least de-emphasize, the "recipient versus bene-
ficiary" distinction for the reasons detailed above.' Then, the Court should
identify and define two specific categories of entities that qualify as statutory
recipients of federal financial assistance: contractual recipients ras and in-
tended recipients.s4 The following subsections describe the two proposed
categories in more detail."s
A. Contractual Recipients
An entity should qualify as a statutory recipient if it is a contractual
recipient of federal financial assistance. The Paralyzed Veterans Court ex-
plicitly emphasized the contractual nature of the nondiscrimination statutes. 6
The Supreme Court has cited both Congress's intent' andthe inherent nature
of spending clause legislation" in support ofthat contractual emphasis. Any
279. See Brief for Petitioner at 35, Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459
(1999) (No. 98-84) (listing organizations with federally funded members).
280. See supra Part 11A (describing potential consequences); supra Part III.B (chronicling
lower court confusion).
281. See infra notes 283-326 and accompanying text (detailing two-part solution).
282. See supra Part I (analyzing Supreme Court's refinement of recipient versus benefi-
ciary standard and lower courts' application thereof).
283. See infra Part IVA (offering and explaining merits of contractual recipient category).
284. See infra Part lV.B (offering and explaining merits of intended recipient category).
285. See infra notes 287-326 (detailing proposed categories).
286. See United States Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597, 605
(1986) (acknowledging that "[u]nder the program-specific statutes, Title VI, Title IX, and § 504,
Congress enters into an arrangement in the nature of a contract with the recipients of the
funds"). Justice Powell further explained that "the recipient's acceptance of the funds" is what
triggers the coverage of the nondiscrimination provisions. Id.
287. See id (recognizing Congress's intent "to impose § 504 coverage as contractual cost"
of accepting federal funds). The Para[yzed Veterans Court noted that Congress required
providing for the handicapped as a "quid pro quo" for federal funds. Id. (citing Consol. Rail
Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624,633 n. 13 (1984)).
288. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1,17 (1981) (recognizing
that "legislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is much in the nature of a contract in
return for federal funds, the States agree to comply with federally imposed conditions"). The
Pennhurst Court concluded: "The legitimacy of Congress' power to legislate under the spend-
ing power thus rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of 'con-
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categorical definition of statutory recipient should also emphasize contractual
principles for those very same two reasons. Therefore, the first question
under the statutory recipient test should be whether the entity and the govern-
ment enjoy a contractual relationship.289 If they do, then the entity is subject
to the nondiscrimination statutes.2 If not, the court should proceed to the
second category.?
A determination of whether an entity is a contractual recipient is a simple
process. As mentioned earlier, one must first look to the grant statute to
determine to whom the statute authorizes direct federal disbursements. z2 An
entity should be characterized as a contractual recipient only if it exchanged
a promise to abide by the nondiscrimination statutes in exchange for federal
funds.t  The principle here is that only those parties in a position to accept
or reject the funds should be subject to the nondiscrimination obligations.
294
The contractual emphasis is appealing from a procedural standpoint as
well. The nondiscrimination statutes provide the government with an explicit
remedy for the violation of the statutes.m If the recipient of federal financial
assistance fails to comply with the nondiscrimination demands, the govern-
ment may refuse or withdraw finds.29' However, if there is no explicit con-
tractual relationship, then the government would be in no position to effectu-
ate the primary remedy for violation. 2m Furthermore, private suits against
tract."' Id.; see also 110 CoNG. REc. 1542 (remarks of Rep. Lindsay) ("The mandate of Title
VI is very simple. Stop the discrimination, get the money, continue the discrimination, do not
get the money.").
289. See supra notes 148-53, 166-68 and accompanying text (explaining significance of
contractual principles within statutory recipient inquiry).
290. See supra notes 29, 35-37 (citing statutes prohibiting discrimination based on race,
color, national origin, sex, disability, and age).
291. See Part IV.B (describing second proposed category- intended recipients).
292. See United States Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597, 604
(1986) (examining terms of underlying grant statute); see also supra notes 163-65 and accompa-
nying text (detailing initial step of statutory recipient inquiry).
293. See Paralyzed Veterans, 477 U.S. at 605 (explaining that coverage under nondiscrimi-
nation statute was contractual cost of accepting federal funds); see also supra notes 148-53,
166-68 and accompanying text (detailing nondiscrimination statutes' contractual nature).
294. See Parabyed Veterans, 477 U.S. at 606 (noting that Congress intended to impose
obligations as result of acceptance of federal funds); see also supra notes 148-53, 166-68 and
accompanying text (detailing nondiscrimination statutes' contractual nature).
295. See supra Part 1A.2 (detailing remedies for violation of nondiscrimination statutes).
296. See supra notes 78-85 and accompanying text (explaining government's remedial
options).
297. See supra notes 78-85 and accompanying text (explaining government's remedial
options). Another issue courts may need to consider is whether it would be fair to the direct
recipient to revoke its funds for another entity's discrimination.
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non-contractual recipients may also be precluded because it is doubtful that
Congress intended for an implied private right of action to cover conduct the
government itself can not check." Thus, a definition of statutory recipient
that emphasizes contractual principles is consistent with the remedial provi-
sions of the nondiscrimination statutes.'
A contractual emphasis also guarantees notice to an entity. Notice is
important in spending legislation because Congress's power to legislate under
the spending clause depends on the recipient's knowing acceptance of the
conditions.3" The nondiscrimination statutes recognize the necessity of notice
and thus require recipients of federal financial assistance to execute a written
assurance of compliance." To hold an entity such as the NCAA subject to
the nondiscrimination provisions without first giving it notice of its obliga-
tions could violate the constitutional limitations of spending clause legisla-
tion."es Classifying an entity as a statutory recipient because it is a contractual
recipient would assure an entity of its exact status.
B. Intended Recipients
If an entity is classified as a contractual recipient, then the entity should
qualify as a statutory recipient. 3 However, an entity should also qualify as a
statutory recipient if it is an intended recipient. Although the face of the non-
discrimination statutes purports to apply onlyto contractual recipients, such a
limited reading of the statutes' application would severely frustrate their
purposes.' Congress could not have intended to let a recipient of federal
funds avoid the nondiscrimination obligation simply by turning over its funds
298. See Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459,467 n.5 (1999) (rejecting
position that private right ofection available under 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (Title IX) is potentially
broader than government's enforcement authority under § 1682); see also supra notes 86-94
and accompanying text (discussing nature of private remedy in light of limitations on govern-
ment remedy).
299. See supra Part ILA.2 (describing statutory remedies for violation ofnondiscrimination
statutes).
300. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (discussing
legitimacy of Congress's spending power); supra notes 91-94, 262-64 and accompanying text
(describing how nature of nondiscrimination statutes as spending legislation limits definition
of statutory recipient).
301. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.4 (1999) (requiring "Assurance of Compliance"); see also supra
note 83 (providing text of "Assurance of Compliance" regulation).
302. See supra notes 91-94,261-63 and accompanying text (describing how nature of non-
discrimination statutes as spending legislation may require notice before liability under statrtes).
303. See supra note 14 (explaining this Note's shorthand use of "statutory recipient").
304. See Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 80 F. Supp. 2d 729, 733
(WD. Mich. 2000) (rejecting argument that "only recipients of federal funds are subject to Title
IX" because that interpretation "is at odds with the plain meaning and purpose of the statute").
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to a third party.305 Furthermore, Congress may explicitly grant money to one
entity, but at the same time, intend for a different entity to be the ultimate
recipient.306 The definition of recipient must include a category that will
encompass both of the above-described scenarios. The proposed category of
"intended recipient" detailed below does just that. 7
The intended recipient category may be applied as follows. If the court
finds no express contractual privity between an entity and the government, the
court should then ask whether the entity is the intended recipient of the federal
financial assistance.3 An entity may qualify as the intended recipient in
either of two ways.3' First, the entity may qualify as the explicitly intended




An entity is the explicitly intended recipient if the grant statute or its
legislative history indicates that it was the intended recipient. For example,
in Grove City, the Court deemed the college a statutory recipient of federal
financial assistance even though individual students were the direct recipients
ofthe federal grants. 312 The indirect aid still qualified the college for statutory
recipient status because Congress intended for the educational institutions to
be the ultimate recipients of the federal funds. 13 Although the Grove City
Court labeled the college an "indirect" recipient, the college was actually a
recipient because it was the "intended" indirect recipient.314
305. See id. at 734 (expressing court's concern that restricting coverage under nondiscrimi-
nation statutes to statutory recipients was "empty formalism" because it "would allow entities
that controlled [federal] funds to discriminate so long as those entities were not themselves
'recipients'").
306. See Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555,565-70 (1984) (describing how Congress
intended college as statutory recipient even though grant statute designated student as recipient).
307. See infra Parts IV.B.1 & 2 (offering two categories of intended statutory recipients
that will encompass both indirect yet intended recipients and also third party recipients).
308. See supra Part IVA (providing test for contractual privity as primary basis for statu-
tory recipient status).
309. See infra Part IV.B.1 & 2 (delineating test for explicitly intended and implicitly
intended recipients).
310. See infra Part IV.B.1 (outlining explicitly intended inquiry).
311. See infra Part IVJ3.2 (listing factors that favor qualifying entity as implicitly intended
recipient).
312. See Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 564-70 (1984) (subjecting college
program to Title IX coverage based on indirect yet intended federal financial assistance).
313. See id. at 565-66 (explaining that one of Congress's stated purposes was to provide
assistance to educational institutions).
314. See United States Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans ofAm., 477 U.S. 597,606-
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However, limiting the intended recipient category to explicitly intended
recipients may not define statutory recipient broadly enough. For example,
the explicitly intended recipient category fails to cover the situation in which
a contractual recipient parcels out all of its federal assistance or passes on
complete control over the assistance to a third party.' Lower courts have
recognized this gap and have responded with the problematic "controlling
authority" theory.
3 16
However, despite its problems as a category of its own, the controlling
authority inquiry may still be useful.317 Controlling authority could be a




An entity may also qualify as a statutory recipient if it is an implicitly
intended recipient. Whether an entity is an implicitly intended recipient
depends on several factors, including controlling authority.319 If an entity exer-
cised controlling authority over a program or activity at the time of the grant,
one may infer that Congress intended for the assistance to go to that entity. A
court inquiring into whether an entity is the implicitly intended recipient
should thus examine controlling authority as one factor, but not as the only
factor.
320
A court should also examine whether the contractual recipient is a "mere
conduit" of the aid. A mere conduit of federal financial assistance is an inter-
mediary contractual recipient who does not have a contractual right to use the
money on its own. Rather, the mere conduit depends upon the existence of a
separate entity - the implicitly intended recipient - in order to use the assis-
tance. For example, in Grove City, the student's right to the federal money
07 (1986) (framing Grove City Court's indirect recipient inquiry within context of intended
recipient inquiry).
315. See Cmtys. for Equity v. Mfich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 80 F. Supp. 2d 729, 733
(W-D. Mich. 2000) (rejecting argument that "only recipients of federal funds are subject to Title
IX" because that interpretation "would allow entities that controlled [federal] funds to discrimi-
nate so long as those entities were not themselves 'recipients'").
316. See supra Part IELB.2 (describing and critiquing controlling authority theory).
317. See supra Part LM.B.2.a (listing problems with controlling authority as basis for
statutory recipient status).
318. See infra Part 1VJ3.2 (outlining factors that weigh for and against classifying entity
as implicitly intended recipient of federal financial assistance).
319. See supra Part I]iB.2.a (explaining lower courts' reliance upon controlling authority
theory).
320. See infra notes 323-27 and accompanying text (delineating other factors within im-
plicitly intended recipient category).
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was contingent upon the student's transfer of the money to the college.321
Therefore, the college was likely the implicitly intended recipient of the fed-
eral financial assistance and, under this approach, is subject to the nondiscrim-
ination statutes.32
A court may also examine the nature of the grant money involved. If
Congress singles out the money in the grant statute for a specific purpose and
the entity in question already holds or later accepts assignment of that statu-
tory duty or fimtion, then it is more likely that Congress intended that entity
as the recipient. 3 The entity performing the statutory duty or function is
more likely the implicitly intended recipient and, therefore, is subject to the
nondiscrimination statutes.3
4
A court could also examine the extent of the grant money involved.
More specifically, the court could inquire into whether the entity would still
be able to operate absent the government's financial assistance to the contrac-
tual recipient. If one of the statutory remedies - the termination of federal
funds to the contractual recipient - would also trigger the demise of the entity
in question, then that entity is more likely the implicitly intended recipient.31
V Conclusion
Congress passed Title V, Title X, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Age
Discrimination Act to ensure that federal funds are not used in a discrimina-
tory manner. 6 Congress chose to accomplish that goal with an explicit "trig-
321. See Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555,565 n.13 (1984) (explaining that students'
eligibility for federal assistance is conditioned upon continued enrollment and progress in
course of study). Furthermore, regulations required students to file affidavits promising that
they would use their awards solely for attendance-related expenses. Id. (citing 20 U.S.C.
§ 1091(aX5) (1982); 34 CFR. §§ 690.79, 690.94(aX2) (1983)). The Court was careful to dis-
tinguish student grant money from other individual grants that benefit individuals and other
"down the line" beneficiaries, such as food stamps, Social Security benefits, and welfare. Id.
322. See Grove City, 465 U.S. at 569-70 (finding powerful evidence of Congress's intent).
The Court also noted that educational institutions could still opt out offederal student assistance
programs. Id. at 565 n.13.
323. See Homer v. Ky. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 43 F.3d 265, 272 n.5 (6th Cir. 1994)
(distinguishing indirect recipient athletic association from commercial airlines in Paralyzed
Veterans because association "performs the statutory duties of a recipient of federal funds");
Pottgen v. Mo. State High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 857 F. Supp. 654, 663 (ED. Mo. 1994)
(concluding that delegation of responsibilities for regulation of interscholastic activities favored
recipient status).
324. See supra notes 29, 35-37 (citing statutes that prohibit discrimination on basis of race,
color, national origin, sex, disability, and age).
325. See supra notes 78-85 and accompanying text (discussing remedies available to gov-
ernment for violation of nondiscrimination statutes).
326. See supra Part I.A (including discussion of Congress's intent within explanation of
nondiscrimination statutes).
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ger" - only those programs or activities receiving federal financial assistance
are subject to the nondiscrimination demands of the statutes. 327 However,
absent a statutory definition section from Congress, courts have toiled over the
years to define exactly what kinds of entities qualify as a statutory recipi-
ents.
328
Although the Supreme Court has offered the distinction between a recip-
ient and a beneficiary as guidance,3" lower courts have struggled with the task
of applying that distinction.33° Unsatisfied withtheir results, some courts have
proffered another basis for liability under the nondiscrimination statutes:
controlling authority over a recipient.33 ' However, the controlling authority
theory suffers from its own problems in definition and in application.332
This Note suggests that a recognition of two specific categories of recip-
ients - contractual recipients and intended recipients - more clearly defines
the coverage of the nondiscrimination statutes.3 The theory is simple. A
court first should ask whether an entity is the contractual recipient of federal
financial assistance.334 If an entity is not a contractual recipient, then a court
should ask whether the entity qualifies as an intended recipient of federal
financial assistance.33 If the entity is neither a contractual nor an intended
recipient, then it is not bound by the nondiscrimination stutes
3 36
The two categories feature definite inquiries and specific factors and,
therefore, would provide more guidance to the lower courts than the vague
"recipient versus beneficiary" standard currently in place.3 7 A categorical
definition also would aid organizations like the NCAA in determining whether
they qualify as statutory recipients.3 38 Moreover, the two categories would
327. See supra notes 29, 35-37 (listing nondiscrimination statutes).
328. See supra Part MII (chronicling both Supreme Court and lower courts' attempts to
define statutory recipient).
329. See Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459,468 (1999) (endorsing
distinction between recipients and beneficiaries of federal financial assistance).
330. See supra Part LB.1 (detailing lower courts' problems with applying indirect
recipient theory suggested by Supreme Court).
331. See supra Part IILB.2.a (explaining controlling authority as basis for statutory recip-
ient status).
332. See supra Part IILB.2.b (critiquing controlling authority as basis for statutory recip-
ient status).
333. See supra Part IV (proposing categorical definition of statutory recipient).
334. See supra Part lV.A (oullining test for contractual recipient).
335. See supra Part IV.B (delineating factors within intended recipient test).
336. See supra notes 29,35-37 (listing nondiscrimination statutes).
337. See supra Part ILA (describing Supreme Court's distinction between recipient and
beneficiary).
338. See supra notes 2-26 and accompanying text (describing situation of NCAA).
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encompass some of the entities that the controlling authority theory sought to
include, without also involving all of the negative consequences of that
theory. 39 Of course, a definition of recipient from the pens of Congress
would be an ideal solution. However, until then, court designated categories
of "contractual recipient" and "intended recipient" seem best suited to accom-
plish the goals of the nondiscrimination statutes within their inherently con-
tractual framework.
340
339. See supra Part IV.BI2 (suggesting that controlling authority should remain factor
within implicitly intended recipient category).
340. See supra notes 148-52 (noting Paralyzed Veterans discussion of statutes' contractual
framework).
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